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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this dissertation is to examine (determinants of) explicit and implicit
corporate income tax burdens in the Netherlands and the European Union.
This dissertation consists of three studies:
• An empirical study of the ex/?//c/r corporate tax burdens on companies
domiciled in the European Union;
• An empirical study of the cfefer/w/rtawrs of explicit corporate tax burdens
on companies domiciled in the Netherlands;
• An empirical study of the /mp/zc/Y corporate tax burden on companies
domiciled in the European Union.
The purpose of the first study is to assess the between-country differences
in corporate tax burdens within the European Union, using financial statement
information. Earlier research has either tended to focus on single-country
observations and/or to use modeling to estimate tax burdens. The current study
uses tax burdens as reported in financial statements, i.e., attempts to measure the
ac/wa/ tax burden in several countries.
In the second study the purpose is to identify factors affecting corporate
tax burdens between companies in the Netherlands.
The purpose of the third study is to investigate implicit taxes (Scholes and
Wolfson 1992) in a corporate setting in the European Union. Prior corporate
setting research is only available in a U.S. setting.To place the three empirical studies of this dissertation in context, this
chapter discusses the general background (see Figure 1.1), whereas specific
backgrounds are discussed in each empirical chapter. This chapter continues
along the following lines. Section 1.2 describes different types of taxes, which
are available to lawmakers in general and explains the relevance of these taxes
within the context of this dissertation. In the following section, 1.3, the different
tax research fields are introduced along with the characteristics of these research
fields. Section 1.4 explains the different research domains and the positioning of
these in tax research. Section 1.5 continues with the topics addressed in the













Note: the bold line indicates the research approach taken within this dissertation.











The last few decades, total tax revenues within the EU have risen from an
average of 33.5% of Gross Domestic Product in 1970 to 42.5% in 2000
(Cnossen 2001). To generate these revenues, lawmakers can design different
forms of taxes (Musgrave 1969; Stiglitz 2000). The two broad classes of taxes
are:
• Direct taxes on individuals and corporations;
• Indirect taxes on goods and services.
Direct taxes are directly borne by the tor s«6/ec/ (i.e., individuals or
organizations) and are for the largest part levied on income (Stiglitz 2000). In
contrast, indirect taxes are levied on /ax oft/ectt (e.g., goods and services).
Direct taxes include:
• Income taxes, both personal and corporate;
• Payroll taxes;
• Other taxes.
Below, a short description of each category is provided.
1.2.2 Income taxes
Income taxes are levied either on personal income or on corporate income.
Personal income taxes are usually progressively levied on taxable income,
whereas corporate income taxes are levied mainly proportional to taxable
income. Common elements taken into account when assessing the level of
(corporate) income taxes to be paid are:
Tax base: what elements are to be included in taxable income;
Tax incentives': deduction(s), special depreciation rules, and th
Tax rates: which rate is applied to tax taxable income.
These three common elements vary with regard to their definitions and
levels between countries, but also within countries, between companies. Not
only do lawmakers purposely implement tax incentives for specific (groups of)
taxpayers, individual and corporate taxpayers often do their best to structure
' Along with "tax incentives", also the comparable expressions "tax facilities" and "tax
subsidies" are used in the literature. This dissertation will use "tax incentives" throughout,
even when tax disincentives are meant.their activities in such a manner as to reduce their taxes payable. Such
structuring of activities can be legal ("tax planning"^) or be illegal ("tax
evasion"') (Pearlman 1998).
1.2.3 Payroll taxes
Payroll taxes are levied directly on the payrolls of employers and have to be
remitted to the taxing authorities by these employers. They are withholding
taxes with regard to the personal income tax, that is: payroll taxes are deducted
from the personal income taxes payable.
In cases where no personal income taxes are levied'', payroll taxes are
sometimes not settled with income taxes and thus can be the only taxes levied on
personal income. Like personal income taxes, payroll taxes tend to be
progressively levied on payroll levels. Due to the nature of payroll taxes (paid
by employers on behalf of employees and calculated using predetermined
tables), there are limited opportunities to reduce payroll taxes payable by the tax
subjects.
1.2.4 Other direct taxes
One of the most important other direct taxes (this depends on the country
though) are social security contributions. Especially in continental European
countries, social security contributions generate a large portion of governmental
revenues. In some instances (e.g., the Netherlands), social security contributions
are levied in an integrated manner, together with personal income taxes.
Social security contributions comprise a variety of elements, depending
on country and socio-demographic properties of the tax subjects, but can include
contributions for: disability benefits, unemployment benefits, widow(er) and
orphan(s) benefits, and health benefits. Often social security benefits are
partially paid by the employer and partially by the employee. This leaves fewer
opportunities for the tax subject to try to reduce social securities contributions
payable.
- This is also referred to as "tax avoidance" (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2000).
' "Tax evasion" includes "tax fraud", but also other forms of income underreporting (Engel
andHines 1999).
•* For instance, when the taxpayer does not file a personal income tax return.1.2.5 Indirect taxes
Indirect taxes are characterized as taxes levied on /ax ofc/ecte, not on rax
(Stiglitz 2000). They are typically levied on a proportional basis. Within the
European Union, value added taxes (VAT) are one of the most important
indirect taxes. Indirect taxes include:
• Value added taxes (VAT)/Sales taxes;
• Duties on imported goods/excises on particular products, such as tobacco
and alcohol;
• Other taxes, such as property taxes and transfer taxes.
1.2.6 Value added taxes/sales taxes
Most countries in the world have either a sales tax or a value added tax (VAT).
A sales tax is levied on the final sale of a good or service to the consumer,
whereas a VAT is levied on the value added to a good or service during the
stages of the production process.
A sales tax is applied in Canada and the U.S. among others (with rates
mainly varying between 0 and 10%), whereas all European Union countries
apply a VAT with a minimum rate of 15%, generating on average about 17% of
total tax revenues in the European Union (Van den Noord and Heady 2001).
1.2.7 Duties/excises
Duties and excises are levied on a variety of goods, ranging from duties on
agricultural products* to excises on alcohol. The use of duties and excises is
often motivated by specific reasons, such as limiting of competition and
prevention of behavior deemed unhealthy.
Due to these different reasons for the institution of duties and excises and
the different levels of taxation (ranging from a few percent to several hundred
percent), this particular kind of indirect taxes offers a (very) complicated
structure.
1.2.8 Other indirect taxes
Governments levy a large amount of other indirect taxes, such as property and
transfer taxes, to name but just two. These taxes can be characterized by their
specific nature; they are levied by specific governments (e.g., provincial
governments) and/or are levied on specific objects (e.g., share capital).
' Within the EU, these duties are part of the "common agricultural policy (CAP)"1.2.9 Taxes: conclusion
The above discussion of direct and indirect taxes shows a large variety in
purposes and structures of taxes. In general, two types of taxes can be
distinguished: direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes offer more opportunities for
tax planning than indirect taxes, as the tax subject is also the actual taxpayer.
Within the category of direct taxes, corporate income taxes offer more
possibilities for tax planning, as organizations (being a collection of capital
investments) are more mobile than individuals (representing a combination of
capital and labor), both within and between countries (Gorter and Parikh 2000).
Corporate income taxes are the subject of this dissertation.
1.3 Tax research fields focusing on corporate income taxes
1.3.1 Overview




Below, a short description of each research field with respect to corporate
income taxes is provided.
1.3.2 Economics
As with business research, economics research comprises a variety of research
techniques and research questions. Stiglitz (2000) provides some examples of
research questions typically addressed in economics research:
• On what economic elements is the corporation tax a tax on?
• Who bears the burden: stockholders, employees, or consumers?
• How does the corporation tax affect economic efficiency?
• How does the corporation tax affect financial decisions: debt, dividend,
and mergers?
• Should there be a tax on corporations?
Earlier economics research (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Musgrave 1969;
Musgrave and Musgrave 1989) has shown that corporate income taxes affect
economic decisions taken by organizations. More recent economics research has
developed the notion of "tax competition" between governments (Hines 1999;Wilson 1999). Several empirical studies (e.g.. De Mooij and Ederveen 2001,
Van den Noord and Heady 2001) document the possible effects of such "tax
competition". Cnossen (2001) provides a comprehensive economic perspective
review of tax policy in the EU, including current developments, issues, and
options.
1.3.3 Business
Business type research deals with the interaction between corporate income
taxes and company activities in the broadest sense, mainly in the finance and
accounting areas. Although tax research tends to be concentrated in specific
areas, such as finance and accounting, a variety of research is encountered,
including empirical, normative, and positive research (Shackelford and Shevlin
2001). Some major research areas are (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001):
• Coordination of tax and non-tax costs;
• Effects of taxes on asset prices;
• Taxation of multi-jurisdictional commerce.
These research areas show a close link between the economics and
business research fields. Especially with regard to the topics in this dissertation
(see below), there is a close link between the economics and business research
fields. The business research field has input from the economics research field,
whereas the economics research field receives input from business researchers
(Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). This dissertation will mainly focus on the
business research field in taxation research, with a further focus on the
accounting area within this research field.
1.3.4 Legal
In contrast to business and economics research, legal research tends to focus on
descriptive research, describing the corporate tax law(s) and its applications. As
a result of this and of the nature of laws, legal research tends to be national in
character. As far as international legal research is undertaken, it mainly deals
with specific instances of cross-border transactions. Such research can be found
in a variety of legal journals. Details on national tax laws themselves can be
found in reference works, such as the European Tax Handbook (1998; published
yearly) and International Tax Summaries (1998; published yearly). Detailed
information on the Dutch corporate income tax can, for instance, be found in
Verbürg (2000).1.4 Tax research domains in accounting
1.4.1 Overview
The accounting area of the business research field relating to corporate income
taxes research includes the following research domains (Shevlin 1999): Tax
compliance; this domain focuses on the reporting aspect of taxes (e.g., filing tax
returns) and is thus ex post. This is in contrast to tax planning, which deals ex
ante with the structuring of (corporate) activities. The third domain, tax policy,
is economics based and assesses the effects of tax behavior by tax subjects.
To investigate issues within these domains, researchers can use the
following methodologies (Shevlin 1999): behavioral, using this methodology tax
researchers can investigate the effects of tax rules on the behavior of tax
subjects; experimental markets, using this methodology tax researchers can
investigate responses of test subjects to specific settings in a laboratory
environment; analytical, using this methodology tax researchers use theoretical
frameworks to analyze relationships between tax and non-tax factors; archival
empirical, using this methodology tax researchers use existing data sources (e.g.,
financial statements) to investigate relationships between tax and non-tax
factors.
Below, a brief description of these research domains and relevant
methodologies is provided.
1.4.2 Tax compliance
Research in this domain tries to answer the question what factors determine
compliance with the tax code (Shevlin 1999). This domain mainly employs the
following research methodologies: behavioral, analytical, and archival
empirical. Roberts (1998) and Shields, Solomon, and Jackson (1995) all provide
an overview of this research domain. In general the authors describe the
relationship between (environmental) factors and the level of compliance of
taxpayers.
1.4.3 Tax planning
Tax planning research tries to answer the question how individuals and
companies respond to tax rules (Shevlin 1999). Most of the research in this
domain uses the archival empirical research methodology. This dissertation is an
example of research within this domain, specifically with regard to companies.
More information is provided in section 1.5 and the empirical chapters.1.4.4 Tax policy
The overall goal of tax policy research is to assess the effects (and possibly
effectiveness) of tax rule changes (Shevlin 1999). The main research
methodologies employed in this area are archival empirical and to a lesser extent
analytical research (e.g., Harris and Sansing 1998). Most tax policy research is
ex post, thus evaluating tax rule changes. Zimmerman (1983) has had an
influential role in encouraging this type of research. His research deals with the
distribution of taxes within the corporate sector. Research in this area is closely
related to the empirical studies in this dissertation.
1.5 Dissertation topic
Within the tax planning domain*, this dissertation investigates the tax burden
issue, which includes both equity and efficiency issues (Callihan 1994). £<7«/Yy
of the tax system^ is often measured by comparing average effective tax rates
across organizations, whereas e^ic/ewcy of the tax system^ is often measured by
comparing marginal effective tax rates of alternative investments.
Figure 1.2 provides more information on these different ways to measure
tax burdens, starting with the distinction between average and marginal tax
burdens. Using one of these burdens, several measurements can be used: macro
backward, which uses macro-economic data, such as the ratio of corporate tax
revenues to total government revenues; micro backward, which uses company
data, usually financial statement information, and micro forward, using forward
looking theoretical models, often based on the King-Fullerton approach.
Nicodeme (2001) provides more information on the different measurement
methods.
As the goal of this dissertation is to examine (determinants of) explicit
and implicit corporate tax burdens, average effective tax rates (ETRs) are used
in the empirical chapters. ETRs are defined as (current) tax charge (derived from
the company's financial statements) divided by pre-tax financial accounting
income (Callihan 1994). Thus, ETRs measure the amount of (explicit) taxes
payable by the company, as a fraction of pre-tax accounting income.
* The tax planning and tax policy domains are closely related. Thus, tax planning research has
often tax policy implications and vice versa. Part of the empirical research in this dissertation
could also be labelled as "tax policy" research.
' £<7«;7y of the tax system refers to the extent in which different taxpayers are taxed in the
same manner. In contrast, e#?c/encv of the tax system refers to the influence of taxes on
economic decisions.
* Köthenbürger (2002) provides more information on the effects of tax competition, especially
with regard to efficiency.




















•Empirical: Calculated using empirical data (e.g., financial statement information)
^Theoretical: Calculated using statutory features of the corporate income tax
*- Note: Figure is partially based on Nicodeme (2001).1.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context for the three empirical
chapters in this dissertation. An, admittedly brief, overview of corporate income
tax research shows that the three empirical chapters can be set in the accounting
area of business research (with a strong link to the economics research field)
addressing the corporate income tax using an archival empirical methodology.
To measure (determinants of) implicit and explicit corporate tax burdens,
the three following chapters use (derivatives of) average effective tax rates
based on financial statement information. The first empirical chapter, chapter 2,
will investigate the explicit corporate tax burden on companies domiciled in the
European Union. Chapter 3 contains a study on the determinants of explicit
corporate tax burdens in the Netherlands. Following this, chapter 4 includes a
study on the implicit corporate tax burdens in the European Union. The last
chapter, chapter 5, will provide a conclusion.
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Evidence of the Effect of Domicile on Corporate
Average Effective Tax Rates in the European Union
2.1 Introduction
This chapter' uses consolidated financial statements to determine actual or
effective tax rates (ETRs) for companies domiciled in European Union (EU)
member states. There already exist differences in statutory corporate tax rates
(STRs)" between EU countries. These differences are relatively easy to observe
(see below). But EU countries also provide tax incentives to companies. To the
extent that this happens, STRs do not provide a complete picture of (1) actual
corporate tax burdens in EU countries, and (2) of differences in actual corporate
tax burdens between companies domiciled in different EU countries. In this
chapter an attempt is made to determine ETRs experienced by companies in EU
countries using consolidated financial statement data for the recent 1990 - 1996
period. These ETRs provide a picture of both differences in STRs a«</ the
provision of tax incentives between EU member states, i.e., of actual corporate
tax burdens.
Such a picture is important because actual corporate tax burdens, which
ETRs attempt to measure, are generally thought to be an important element in
the "competitive" position of a country, e.g., in terms of location decisions of
companies" or of founding rates of new companies. Also, actual corporate tax
burdens are a constant item in discussions about tax competition between
countries in general and between EU countries in particular. Knowledge about
actual tax burdens is important for these discussions.
This chapter is the first empirical study to measure ETRs using financial
statement information for (public) companies in all 15 current EU member
' This chapter is based on Buijink, Janssen, and Schols (2002).
' Statutory tax rates are the tax rates mentioned in the applicable corporate tax laws.
' For a recent empirical study, see Devereux and Griffith (1998).
13States. There are alternative approaches to measuring ETRs. This chapter uses
financial statement-based ETRs to measure company-level worldwide corporate
tax burdens. Another approach is to measure assumption-based ETRs.
ETRs determined using financial statements are company specific and
require no simulation and underlying assumptions. They also can be used
conveniently to make a distinction between permanent tax incentives and
temporary tax incentives provided by the EU member state governments to
companies domiciled in their jurisdiction.
Although differences between STRs and ETRs can also provide
information on other factors, such as earnings management, such factors are not
considered in the empirical design(s) in this dissertation.
The empirical findings are as follows. First, comparing EU member states
on the basis of the difference between the STR and the ETR that takes into
account permanent tax incentives, reveals considerable variation. That is, the use
of (permanent) tax incentives differed quite substantially between EU member
states (corporate domiciles) in the recent 1990-1996 period. Second, the range of
the ETRs across EU member states is /ess centered than the statutory tax rate
range. This means that the provision of permanent tax incentives does «or have
the effect of "equalizing" the existing differences in STRs between EU member
states (corporate domiciles).
Additional analyses based on (1) using two alternative ETR measures
(one less sensitive to financial accounting differences between EU member
states and one taking into account temporary tax incentives as well), (2)
restricting the analysis to those countries that already were a EU member state in
1990, and (3) restricting the analysis to those EU member states that had already
adapted national law to the seventh EU company law Directive, requiring
consolidated financial statements from EU companies, by 1990, do not change
these findings.
2.2 Motivation, ETR measurement, financial accounting issues, and
previous research
2.2.1 Motivation and ETR measurement
STRs and tax bases (the amount of income on which entities are taxed) differ
between EU Member States. The last few years these intra-EU differences have
given rise to an increasingly active political discussion. The discussion is driven
by the fact that taxes represent an actual cash outflow to companies and can be
expected to affect (1) the attractiveness of company formation in EU countries,
as well as (2) location decisions of EU (and non-EU) companies. These
differences in corporate tax rates and tax bases create both an interest of the
various national governments in corporate tax policy and an interest in tax
14policy on the part of companies in order to be able to decide on their preferred
domicile.
Tax competition between countries in the area of corporate taxes can
focus on (1) the STR, and additionally on (2) the provision of tax incentives in
various forms . To measure the corporate tax rate effectively experienced by a
company domiciled in a given country, it is necessary to measure the tax rate in
that country inclusive of the tax incentives effects, i.e., the effective tax rate, as
opposed to statutory, tax rate. This chapter uses data for the companies in the
current 15 EU member states. The data used are for the years from 1990 to
1996. Of the current 15 EU member states, 12 joined the EU before 1990.
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. As a sensitivity check, an
analysis of the data of the 12 pre-1990 EU members is provided.
The research question that this chapter attempts to answer is the
following: what effect does the provision of tax incentives have on actual
corporate tax burdens in EU member states? In particular: how do tax incentives
affect the differences in actual corporate tax burden (ETR) within the EU when
compared with the differences between EU member state STRs? Note, that
larger, smaller, or similar differences in ETRs would all be consistent with tax
incentives based tax competition between EU member states. That is, tax
competition using tax incentives can have all three effects. This paper attempts
to find out which effect is present. Examples of tax incentives that would affect
ETRs in EU member states differentially are the following: the possibility of
tax-loss carry backs and carry forwards, fiscal unity arrangements
(compensating losses and profits between companies, in a group of companies),
and participation exemption arrangements (relief for the income of (possibly
foreign) subsidiaries already taxed).
Prior research has developed various ETR measures to measure corporate
tax burdens taking into account tax incentives. Basically four (classes of)
measures exist: (1) the effective marginal tax rate, (2) the effective average tax
rate, (3) the financial accounting information based marginal effective tax rate,
and (4) the financial accounting information based average effective tax rate.
The four classes of measures are named this way to avoid confusion. The
original terminology used in the literature is slightly different. The important
distinction is that (3) and (4) are based, completely or in part, on actual financial
accounting data, whereas (1) and (2) are based on an assumed "typical"
investment project. Below, each measure is briefly discussed.
The effective marginal and the effective average tax rate are computed for
a "typical" investment project earning no economic rents (for the effective
marginal tax rate) and assumed positive rents (for the effective average tax rate).
In both cases, the tax rate is the difference between the pre-tax return and the
•* Alternatively, the statement here could be phrased referring to differences in the corporate
tax base, i.e., taxable income.
15post-tax return as a proportion of the post-tax return in a given country (tax
jurisdiction) for a "typical" project. Chennells and Griffith (1997, appendix A)
provide a clear recent discussion of both measures.
In contrast, both the financial accounting information based marginal and
average effective tax rate are calculated using actual company financial
statements. Graham (1996, p. 189) conceptually defines the marginal effective
tax rate in year t for a company as "... the present value of [the current and]
future tax obligation with earning US$1 of (taxable) income in year t". He
discusses eight possible effective marginal tax rate measures found in the
literature. All are at least in part financial statements based. The average
effective tax rate, finally, can be broadly defined as taxes paid by a company in
a fiscal year divided by financial accounting income (Graham 1996, p. 195).
Callihan (1994, section 1), Chennells and Griffith (1997, appendix A),
and Collins and Shackelford (1995, pp. 56-57) all discuss the relative
advantages of the different classes of ETR measures.
In this chapter the effect of domicile on corporate tax incentives in EU
member states is measured using the financial accounting information based
average effective tax rate (average ETR), because the objective is to estimate the
effect of tax incentives on the tax burden as it affects ac7wa/ companies in the
EU. As will become clear below, the average ETR purports to measure
worldwide taxes payable for a given year as a fraction of worldwide pre-tax
financial accounting income.
A comparison of worldwide ETRs for companies in EU member states
with STRs in the countries in which these companies are domiciled is made. In
the case of domestic companies, this comparison is non-controversial. In the
case of multinational companies, also the STR of the country in which the parent
company of the group is domiciled is used. This domicile STR is used because it
is the government of the country in which the parent company is domiciled that
makes the final decision on how worldwide income of the group of companies is
taxed, i.e., that determines the worldwide tax burden. It must explicitly decide to
exempt or not to exempt from domicile taxation, foreign source income already
taxed abroad, but at a rate (STR or ETR) different from the domicile STR. If
exemption is granted, the exemption is equivalent to the provision of a tax
incentive (when the foreign STR or ETR is lower). Hence, both in this case and
in the case where such an exemption is not granted, the parent company's
domicile STR provides a relevant benchmark for the actual corporate tax burden
in that domicile also for multinational companies.
In case of multinational companies, potential issues also include the
(non-)repatriation of foreign subsidiary income and the in- or exclusion of
subsidiary countries from bilateral tax treaties. All EU countries, except France,
apply a worldwide tax base to their calculation of taxable income. The
worldwide tax base principally covers worldwide income from all sources,
16including dividend and capital gains from foreign subsidiaries as an accrual
basis is used to determine income.
2.2.2 Within-EU accounting related ETR measurement issues
A problem with the determination of company average ETRs in EU member
states is that not all member states make the distinction between income in
company financial statements and company taxable income (book-tax link). This
is the case, to a varying degree, in the period considered in this paper, in:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and Sweden. The distinction does exist in the remaining five EU
member states: Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Spain, and the U.K.
(Hoogendoorn 1996a).
However, the book-tax link is primarily an issue at the legal entity level.
Therefore, in this paper consolidated financial statements* are used. In
consolidated financial statements a distinction is made in all EU member states
between consolidated financial accounting income and consolidated taxable
income".
The financial accounting background for the determination of the average
ETR from financial statements is the following.
Two types of differences can exist between financial accounting income
and taxable income. The first type are "temporary differences". These
differences will exist as long as a certain item is included in the tax accounts but
not in the financial accounts or the other way around. A sub-category of
temporary differences are "semi-permanent differences". These differences will
exist as long as a company will continue (1) its operations in general, or (2)
operate the tax-affected assets, and will not reverse during those periods. Such
temporary and semi-permanent differences lead to a deferral of (part of) taxes
payable.
The second type of differences is "permanent differences". These
differences will never cease to exist, i.e., will never reverse, not even when the
company is discontinued. Permanent differences lead to elimination of (part of)
taxes payable.
' The seventh EU company law Directive harmonized consolidated financial accounting in the
EU. In five of the current 15 EU member states the seventh Directive was implemented after
1990: Finland in 1992, Ireland in 1992, Italy in 1991, Portugal in 1991, and Sweden in 1995
(see Nobes and Parker 2000, table 5.7). As a sensitivity check, an analysis for the 10 pre-1990
seventh Directive adopters is included.
* Documentation that underlies this remark for each of the "no-book-tax difference" EU
countries is in Maukner (1998, p. 60) for Austria; in Jorissen and Maes (1996, p. 921) for
Belgium; in Järvenpää (1996, p. 906) for Finland; in Hoareau (1998, p. 112) for France; in
Haller (1998, p. 93) for Germany; in Caseley (1998, p. 479) for Greece; in Zambon (1998, p.
194) for Italy; in Clark (1994, p. 175) for Luxembourg; in Fernandes Ferreira (1998, p. 829)
for Portugal; and in Heurlin and Pettersohn (1998, p. 1109) for Sweden.
17Within the EU, financial accounting for corporate taxes in consolidated
financial statements proceeds as follows. The matching principle requires that
the corporate tax expense item in the financial statements should relate to the
financial accounting income reported in those statements, i.e., requires
"interperiod tax allocation". When financial accounting income is not equal to
taxable income, taxes actually paid will not be equal to the tax expense. In the
financial statements this book-tax difference can be "accommodated" in two
steps. First, permanent differences are always excluded from the tax expense
item in the financial statements. Second, using "interperiod tax allocation",
temporary differences are ex(in)cluded from (in) the tax expense item and this
leads to a deferred tax liability (deferred tax asset)'. All EU countries use the
matching principle for consolidated financial statements and thus, in principle,
require recognition of the deferred tax liability/deferred tax asset.
The above shows that taxes payable for a company for a given year can be
calculated from its consolidated financial statements by using the tax expense
item, which is already exclusive of permanent differences (tax incentives), or by
using an adjusted tax expense item, adjusted for either the appropriation to
(from) the deferred tax liability (asset) or the change in the net deferred tax
position". This adjustment will reflect the temporary differences (tax incentives).
Hence, uniformly the tax expense in the consolidated financial statements
in EU member states is exclusive of the permanent differences. In practice
differences between EU member states in financial accounting for corporate
taxes are possible, but they all concern temporary differences. Examples of a
lack of uniformity in accounting for temporary differences between and within-
EU member states are (Hoogendoorn 1996a, Table 3):
• A deferred tax asset is not recognized consistently because of the
prudence principle or is netted against the deferred tax liability;
• There is no uniformity in "partial" or "full provision" for deferred taxes;
• There is no uniformity in the use of nominal or present value for deferred
taxes;
• There is no uniformity in the approach for dealing with (expected) tax rate
changes;
" There is no uniformity in deferred tax accounting for asset revaluation.
However, these complications are less of a problem in the consolidated
financial statements that are used here, because EU consolidated financial
statements are more standardized than EU parent-company financial statements.
' An alternative treatment is to ignore the book-tax difference. The advantage of this "flow-
through accounting" treatment is simplicity. The disadvantage of the method is that it does
not adhere to the matching principle.
* Actually, this is an estimate of that amount, see Plesko (2003). This is a further
complication.
18Notwithstanding intra-EU financial accounting harmonization efforts,
such as the fourth EU company law Directive that sets standards for the format
and layout of EU financial statements, other differences in prescribed financial
accounting methods still exist. But again, this problem is less important at the
level of consolidated financial statements'*. This argument is a second reason for
restricting the analysis to consolidated financial statements in EU member
states.
The above underlies the three ETR measures used below. The first ETR
measure relates tax expense (which excludes permanent differences) to before
tax financial accounting income. In the second ETR measure, a company
income measure is used that is less sensible to financial accounting differences
between EU member states. In the third ETR measure, the tax expense is
adjusted for temporary differences.
Also, 7-, 6-, or 5-year panels (see below for an explanation) of companies
domiciled in the EU are used to calculate average ETRs for each company for
the 7-, 6-, or 5-year periods. Note that this approach will further a//ev/ate the
effect of lack of uniformity between EU member states in financial accounting
for temporary differences and of financial accounting, in general. This is caused
by the reversal property of temporary differences and of accrual accounting
methods, in general, on the ETR measures that are calculated.
2.2.3 Average ETRs: prior cross-country research
There exist a number of single-country financial accounting-based average ETR
studies. Studies using EU member state data include Holland (1998) for the
U.K., Janssen and Buijink (1998) for The Netherlands, and Ballas and Hevas
(1999) for Greece. The most recent single-country papers using U.S. data are
Gupta and Newberry (1997), and Plesko (2003). The last two papers provide
references to earlier papers using U.S. data.
In this section, however, the focus is on the available comparative cross-
country studies. Comparative cross-country ETR results are rare, but include
Chennells and Griffith (1997), and Collins and Shackelford (1995).
Collins and Shackelford (1995) calculate average ETRs (adjusted for
temporary differences) for companies domiciled in Canada, Japan, the U.K., and
the U.S. They use the G/ofoj/ Fow/age database, for the period from 1982 to
1991, resulting in a total of 30,037 firm-year observations. One central finding is
that Japanese companies pay higher and Canadian companies pay lower
percentages of financial accounting income in corporate tax (have higher (lower)
ETRs) then do companies from the U.K. and the U.S.
As Nobes and Parker (2000, p. 88) conclude: "The seventh Directive has achieved a
significant degree of harmonization in group accounting (within the EU)."
19Chennells and Griffith (1997) also use the G/o£a/ Fa/Jtage database to
calculate average ETRs (not adjusted for temporary differences). They calculate
these annually for the 1985-1994 period for 10 countries: Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Spain, U.K., and the U.S. Chennells and
Griffith (1997) find considerable differences between STR and mean ETR for
Germany, Italy, and Spain with smaller differences for the other countries.
The results below are directly comparable to the Collins and Shackelford
(1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1997) findings for a larger group of countries
(compared to both studies) and larger company samples per country (compared
to Chennells and Griffith (1997)).
2.3 Methodology: measurement of the average ETR and sample
2.3.1 Average ETR
The average ETR is measured in three different ways. Section 2.2.2 provided the
financial accounting background. The ETRs are defined in the context of the
Wor/dscope financial statement template and its terminology.
The first measure, ETR1, is income taxes (tax expense) divided by
financial accounting pre-tax income before minority interest income, equity in
earnings, and extraordinary income. Extraordinary income is presented net of
tax in the Wo/7<fcco/?e template, as is equity in earnings of non-consolidated
subsidiaries. The inclusion of minority interest income (i.e., its non-elimination)
is conventional in this literature. ETR1 "picks up" permanent tax incentives.
Income taxes are worldwide income taxes. ETR1 is comparable to the
accounting-based ETR measure used in Chennells and Griffith (1997). It is also
used frequently in country-specific ETR research.
As explained earlier, ETR1 is potentially affected by inter-country
differences in accrual financial accounting practices between EU countries. This
result may occur even though this chapter uses consolidated financial statements
and given European financial accounting harmonization. Therefore also, as a
first sensitivity check, a second ETR measure less affected by differences in
financial accounting practices between countries is calculated. An obvious
candidate would be a measure with operating cash flow, i.e., operating income
before non-cash expenses, as the denominator. However, cash flow statement
data are not uniformly available on the fFb/7cfcco/?e CD-ROM, especially in the
earlier years of the period considered. Thus, the income statement item net sales
as the denominator for the second ETR measure, ETR2 (again using income tax
expense as the numerator) is used.
As a second sensitivity check, ETR3 is used. In ETR3, income tax
expense adjusted for the net change in the deferred taxes (balance sheet item) is
the numerator and financial accounting pretax income before minority interest
20(income), equity in earnings (from unconsolidated subsidiaries), and
extraordinary income, is the denominator. ETR3 "picks up" both permanent and
temporar)' tax incentives. ETR3 is directly comparable to the main ETR measure
used in Collins and Shackelford (1995). ETR3 is also frequently used in
previous country-specific research.
Table 1 gives the three ETR measures in terms of the ffor/dscope
financial statement template terminology and item codes.
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The sample is a panel of all active (less inactive status companies), non-financial
(less SIC codes 60, 61, 63 (financial companies) and less non-industrial
financial statement template: i.e., "other" financial companies) companies
whose consolidated financial statements (filter: only consolidated statements)
are available on the WW6fcco/?e CD-ROM in all years from 1990 to 1996
(inclusive). Of course, only companies with domicile in one of the current 15
EU member states were selected. Note, that ffo/Vc/scope's coverage is restricted
to public companies.
For all three ETR measures, only those companies are retained for which
all data-items necessary are available in all 7 years. A last filter removes for all
three measures observations > < 2 standard deviations (S.D.) from the mean
(outliers).
The year 1996 was the latest year available on this version (December
1998) of the ffor/dscope CD-ROM that is used and 1990 the first year (except
for ETR3 for which 1991 is the first year for which results can be calculated).
Table 2 provides details about the initial sample selection. The initial
panel (first five filters) consists of 2,958 companies in EU member states with
data for seven years, i.e., 20,706 firm-years in all. The use of the last two filters
leads to a panel of 2,118 companies (14,826 firm-years) for which ETR1 can be
determined, of 2,083 companies (14,581 firm-years) for ETR2, and of 1,393
companies (8,358 firm-years) for ETR3 (6-year panel). The adjustment for
deferred taxes in ETR3 (1) makes 1991 the first year for which results can be
given, but also (2) leads to considerable loss of company year panels due to loss
of observations in the last year 1996. Therefore also a second ETR3 panel is
21used (ETR3 (5-year panel)) for the period 1991-1995, consisting, after the last
two filters, of 1,628 companies (8,140 firm-years).






Companies domiciled in EU member states with
consolidated financial statements available in
Wo/Vdycope database
Less: companies with inactive status
Less: SIC codes 60, 61 & 63 (financial companies)
Less: companies with a non-industrial template (other
financial companies)
Available companies in initial panel
Available companies in panel for ETR1"
Available companies in panel lor ETR2 ^
Available firm-years for ETR3 * (6-year^ panel)





















•" ETR1 = income taxes/pre-tax income.
*" ETR2 = income taxes/net sales.
* ETR3 = (income taxes- (deferred taxes, - deferred taxes,.i))/pre-tax income.
** As explained in the text, for ETR3, 6- and 5-year panels are used.
Table 3 provides the number of companies in the sub-panel for each of the
EU member states and the corresponding number of firm-years, for each of the
ETR measures. As can be seen, for Luxembourg and Greece the number of firm-
years available is relatively small for ETR1 and ETR2. This is also the case for
those two countries and for Austria and Sweden for ETR3 (6-year panel and 5-
year panels), but not for Greece for the ETR3 for the 5-year panel'".
' Note, that different panel length (6-year vs. 5-year) leads to considerable changes in the
number of observations available in the countries in Table 3.
22Table 3 Number of companies in panel and for effective tax rate (ETR)
calculations for European Union member states (1990-1996, 1991-


























































































































































° ETR1 = income taxes/pre-tax income
*" ETR2 = income taxes/net sales
* ETR3 = (income taxes - (deferred taxes, - deferred taxest-OVpre-tax income
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Statutory tax rates (STRs) in EU member states
Various sources are used to determine the STRs in the EU member states
between 1990 and 1996. Table 4 provides an overview of the annual STRs in the
EU member states for a number of years. A number of member states, notably
France, Germany, and Ireland have multiple corporate tax rates.
It is not immediately obvious how to determine the average STR in each
EU member state for the 1990-1996 period. The average STR for each country
is determined in two ways.
In Table 4 the unweighted average STR for each country is the simple
average, assuming a 50% pay-out ratio for countries (years) with a split-rate
system. For the weighted average STR in Table 4, the weight for each year is the
total pre-tax income for all companies in the ETR1 sample. Additionally, in
countries (years) with a split-rate system the total relative amount of pre-tax
income distributed is also used as weight. For Ireland the number of companies
23in the sample in qualifying industries and their total pre-tax income is used as
weight.
The STRs in Table 4 were calculated disregarding differential capital
gains tax rates and differential tax rates for "low" profits that exist(ed) in a
number of countries. Previous research has often used unweighted STRs,
disregarding differences in STRs across time and companies. Table 4 reports
both unweighted and weighted STRs (taking into account differences in STRs
and relative profit levels), but subsequent analyses are only based on weighted
STRs. As can be seen in Table 4, the average STRs (both unweighted and
weighted) are in the 30-50% region. The top three STRs are in Italy, Germany,
and Belgium, whereas the lowest rates are found in Greece, Sweden, and
Ireland. The correlation between unweighted and weighted STRs is high:
Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.97. Below, the weighted STR is used with
























































































































































































" The sources used for this Table are: Cnossen (1996), Coopers & Lybrand (1998), Easson (1993), Messeree (1993), OECD (1991), Teixeira
(1997), and Tirard (1994); * Unw.avg. = unweighted average of the statutory tax rates for the 1990-1996 period; " W.avg. = weighted average,
taking into account relative profits per year and the distinction between the RE and DP tax rates where applicable, for the 1990-1996 period; ** RE
gives corporate tax on retained earnings; * DP gives corporate tax on distributed profits;' assuming a proportion of retained earnings/distributed
profits of 50/50; *Q gives corporate tax on qualifying companies: i.e., manufacturing companies, manufacturing services, international financial
services, trading operations in Shannon airport, repair and maintenance of aircraft, ships and computer equipment, film production, engineering
services for projects outside Ireland, and organic production;" companies allocated to either tax regime based on SIC industry code.2.4.2 Average ETRs in the EU member states
The total panel of 2,118 companies for ETR1 has been subdivided in 15
subpanels, one for each EU member state. For each country panel of companies,
ETR1 is calculated for each company as the average ETR1 for the period 1990-
1996. The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 Statutory tax rates (STR) and mean (standard deviation) and median
(interquartile range) effective tax rates ((filtered) ETR1) for European





































































































" Statutory tax rates (weighted STRs) are taken from last column of Table 4.
*" ETR1 = income taxes/pre-tax income.
As explained earlier, the ETRl results in Table 5 are on a filtered panel
basis. The panel for each country was filtered by removing outlying
observations with an ETRl, which out-centered the average ETRl for the panel
by more than two standard deviations. Table 5 shows that the mean and median
ETRl are quite close. The focus is on median ETRl. Focusing on the median
results for the filtered data provides additional assurance that outlying
observations, e.g., as in the case of Denmark, do not affect the results. Table 5
shows that median ETRs in EU member states are highest in Germany, Italy,
and Luxembourg, and lowest in Austria, Portugal, and Ireland.
EU member states can also be ranked on the basis of the size of
differences between STR (weighted average) and median ETRl, to show the
effects of tax incentives. Table 6 provides the ranking.
26Table 6 European Union member states ranked by the difference between





















































' Statutory tax rates (weighted STR) are taken from last column of Table 4.
*" ETR1 is taken from before last column of Table 5.
Table 6 shows that, on average, in the EU the median ETR1 is almost 10
percentage points below the STR. There are, however, considerable differences
between the different EU member states. Whereas Sweden and France have a
median ETR1 less then 2 percentage-points below their STR, Austria, Belgium,
and Portugal have a median ETR1 of around 20 percentage points below their
STR.
However (in accordance with the research question in section 2.2.1), the
provision of tax incentives does not lead to ETRs being more equal between EU
member states than the STRs.
Here, and below, the coefficient of variation (CV = standard
deviation/mean) is used as a simple metric to measure the relative variability in
STRs and ETRs between EU member states. The CV of the weighted STR (in
Table 4) is below the coefficient of variation of the filtered median ETR1 (in
Table 5): 19.1% versus 26.6%. Hence, corporate effective tax burdens (ETR1)
do not differ less between countries than do corporate STRs. The provision of




A problem with the ETR1 scores for different EU member states is the
potentially confounding influence of differences in financial reporting practices
between the member states. As explained earlier, ETR2 was also calculated with
a denominator less susceptible to financial accounting practice differences. Net
sales is used as denominator, which "eliminates" all between EU country
accounting related differences. The result, the (filtered) median ETR2 for the
1990-1996 period, is shown in Table 7.
Table 7 Effective tax rates (filtered median ETR2 and filtered median ETR3) for


































































" ETR2 = income taxes/net sales
ETR3 = (income taxes - (deferrt
" ETR3 = (income taxes - (deferred taxesi - deferred taxesi.i))/pre-tax income, 5-year panel
ETR3 = (income taxes - (deferred taxes, - deferred taxes,.i))/pre-tax income, 6-year panel
The CV for median ETR2 in Table 7 is also higher than the CV for STR
(Table 5): 51.8% vs. 19.1%. However, the Pearson's correlation coefficient
between median ETR1 (Table 5) and median ETR 2 (Table 7) is only 0.44,
indicating that ETR1 and ETR2 do not rank EU member states consistently.
Hence, part of the ETR1 differences between countries may be attributable to
financial accounting differences. On the other hand, as explained earlier, ETR2
as defined here is not the ideal "financial accounting differences free" measure.
As a further sensitivity check, ETR3 was calculated, which is ETR1
adjusted for the change in the (net) deferred tax liability. The results are also in
Table 7. They show the filtered median ETR3 scores for each EU member state,
28both for the 6- and the 5-year panel in which 1996 is not used, i.e., for the 1991 -
1995 period. As explained earlier, in the 5-year panel, loss of observations for
the ETR3 is less severe. Overall median ETR3 and ETR1 (Table 5) scores are
similar. ETR3 is lower most of the time, as expected, indicating a slow reversal
of temporary differences. Note, that the 6-year panel ETR3 score for
Luxembourg (1 observation, see Table 3) is extreme. The focus is therefore on
the 5-year panel results therefore. Median ETR1 and ETR3 (5-year panel) also
rank member states similarly, underscoring the results given earlier: Pearson's
correlation coefficient is 0.88. Again, the CV of median ETR3 (5-year panel) is
higher then that for STR (Table 5): 30.7% versus 19.1%.
2.5.2 STRs
Inspection of the CVs of unweighted average STRs in Table 4 and of median
ETR1, ETR2, and ETR3 (5-year panel) already reported does not change the
conclusions of the previous section.
2.5.3 Different sets of countries
Additionally, CVs for weighted STR and median ETR1 (both in Table 5) were
calculated for (1) the group of current EU member states that were already in the
EU before 1990 (15 current member states except Austria, Finland, and
Sweden), and (2) the group of current EU members that had already adapted
national law to the seventh EU company law Directive on consolidated financial
statements in 1990 (fifteen current member states except Ireland, Italy, Finland,
Portugal, and Sweden). For the group of pre-1990 EU members, CVs for STR
and ETR1 are 19.7 and 27.3%. For the group of pre-1990 seventh Directive
adopters the CVs are 13.0 and 22.9%. Again, in both cases, tax incentives
appear to widen the differences in effective corporate tax burdens in the EU
compared to the STRs.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter is the first study that attempts to measure actual worldwide
corporate tax burdens for companies domiciled in all EU member states based
on financial statement information. The main results are that (1) the provision of
tax incentives, both those of a permanent and of a temporary nature, differs
substantially between EU member states, and (2) these tax incentives do «of
have the effect of equalizing actual corporate tax burdens in the EU, i.e., actual
corporate tax burdens differ /wore between EU member states (company
domiciles) than do the statutory tax rates (STRs).
29A limitation of this research is that differences in (1) accounting for
corporate taxation, and in (2) financial accounting in general between EU
member states are problematic. To address both problems, this chapter (1) used
only consolidated financial statements, (2) calculated ETRs for several years,
and (3) provided additional results based on alternative ETR measures.
A further limitation of this paper is that it focused on public companies in
EU member states. Results for ETRs of non-public companies would potentially
provide a more balanced picture of corporate tax burdens in the EU.
An interesting question is, what factors cause differences in ETRs
between EU countries. Collins and Shackelford (1995) begin to explore the
effect on ETRs of foreign activities of companies. However, foreign activity is
but one of several company characteristics that affect ETRs in a given domicile.
Other characteristics that can have this effect, for local and multinational
companies alike, are size (e.g., there could be economies of scale in tax planning
investments), capital intensity (through the tax treatment of depreciation), R&D
intensity (through the tax treatment of R&D expenditures), leverage (through the
tax treatment of interest), ownership status (more concentrated ownership may
lead to more aggressive tax planning), etc. Another interesting question is
whether ETR levels persist over time. In other words, are companies able to
retain tax incentives over time? Although interesting, such questions are outside
the scope of this dissertation and not investigated.
30chapter 3
Determinants of the Variability of Corporate Effective
Tax Rates (ETRs): Evidence for The Netherlands
3.1 Introduction and motivation
Recent empirical research has documented significant differences in financial
statement based estimates of tax costs of corporate domicile between EU member
states (Buijink, Janssen, and Schols (1999,2000a) and de Mooij and Gorter (2001))
and OECD member states (Buijink, Janssen, and Schols (2000b), Chennells and
Griffith (1997), and Collins and Shackelford (1995, 2001)). This research also
documents that in the countries surveyed effective tax rates (ETRs) vary, but are
systematically below the statutory tax rates (STRs) (see also chapter 2 of this
dissertation). The ETR is a measure of a company's tax burden generally calculated
as (current or total) income tax expense divided by before-tax financial accounting
income (Callihan 1994). The differences between STRs and ETRs reflect
differences in tax incentives provided by the governments of these countries to
companies.
This chapter focuses on the variability of the tax costs of corporate domicile
within one country, i.e., on the question of what explains the variation of ETRs
around the country average or median.
Examination of the determinants of the variability of corporate ETRs within
one jurisdiction will lead to an understanding of the pattern and effects of tax
incentives provided to companies within that jurisdiction. This provides the main
motivation for this chapter, with the focus being on the Netherlands.
This chapter builds on earlier research investigating determinants of ETRs.
This research regarding determinants of the cross-section of ETRs has not been
matched by Dutch research. A study by the Dutch tax authorities (Belastingdienst
1997) does investigate cross-sectional differences between the company financial
accounting tax expense and actual taxes paid. Although interesting, the study is
descriptive, focusing on individual not consolidated financial statements and only
31providing aggregated results. It provides no information on the differences observed
in relation to company characteristics. This chapter is the first study to provide
information on the determinants of ETRs for Dutch companies.
This chapter uses a company level panel firm-years sample for six years from
1994 to 1999.
The findings suggest the following. First, ETRs are (at most) a few
percentage points below the statutory tax rates, indicating the (small) magnitude of
tax incentives that are provided to Dutch companies (regarding this point, see also
chapter 2).
Second, statistical results indicate a number of significant relationships
between company characteristics and ETRs. However, the magnitude of these
relationships is small. In general, the levying of corporate income taxes in the
Netherlands appears to be fairly neutral. That is, ETR levels appear, to a large
extent, to be not significantly affected by company characteristics in the
Netherlands.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes
previous research on the variability of ETRs and the hypotheses development.
Section 3.3 explains financial accounting for income taxes in The Netherlands.
Section 3.4 discusses research methods: the source of the data sample, variable
definitions, and model specification. Results are given in section 3.5. The chapter
ends with a summary and concluding remarks in section 3.6.
3.2 Background, previous research, and hypotheses
3.2.1 Background
Research on the determinants of the cross-section of company ETR data begins
with Stickney and McGee (1982). Callihan (1994) is a useful survey of ETR
research up to 1994. As explained in Callihan there are two varieties of empirical
ETR research: research looking at marginal ETRs and research into average ETRs.
The marginal ETR for a specific investment is the rate of tax paid on an additional
unit of income from a specific investment project. Marginal ETRs should be used to
investigate the effect of taxation on investment decisions. Marginal ETRs can also
be used at the level of a company, but of course a company is a collection of
investment projects, which makes the uses of marginal ETRs at that level
problematic. For a discussion, see Callihan (1994, section 3.1.3; see also chapters 1
and 2 of this dissertation).
Average ETRs are better suited to express the overall tax burden on the
company (Callihan 1994). They express the rate of tax paid on company income.
This chapter, because of its focus on the determinants of the variability of the tax
burden across companies, looks at average ETRs. This review of previous research
therefore focuses on average ETRs.
32To provide structure for the discussion of existing company level average
ETR research, this chapter uses an approach developed by Wilkie (1988), that
identifies categories of determinants of the variability of average ETRs across
companies.
ETR is the ratio of tax expense (T) over pre-tax financial accounting income
(I) of a company. Thus,
ETR=y (1)
And tax expense T is taxable income (TI) times the statutory tax rate (t): T = TI * t.
Therefore,
(2)
Wilkie (1988) then introduces the notion of tax preferences' (TP), which is
the difference between financial accounting pre-tax income and taxable income: TP
= I - TI, hence TI = I - TP. Tax preferences include the temporary and permanent
differences between financial accounting pre-tax income and taxable income.
Substituting TI in (2) leads to ETR = [(I - TP) /1] * t, which simplifies to,
t (3) t
for a company, and the subscript i has been omitted.
Equation (3) shows how company ETRs are influenced by the variability
across companies in tax preferences (TP), financial accounting pre-tax income (I),
and tax rate changes (t).
This last equation implicitly underlies previous research on the determinants
of the cross-section of ETRs.
3.2.2 Previous research
In previous research, tax incentives have been modeled as a function of
company size and of a company's operating, financing, and investment decisions.
Zimmerman (1983) suggested that larger companies would, because of their
larger political visibility, have fewer tax incentives available to them than smaller
' Tax preferences are the collective tax incentives provided by the governments of the different
countries the company is located in. Apart from this section, this chapter uses "tax incentives"
throughout.
33companies. An interesting alternative rationale for such an effect is that suggested
by Scholes and Wolfson (1992). They expect that large mature companies may find
it difficult to aggressively pursue tax planning, because that may interfere with
other tax impacted contracts.
The counter argument is that larger companies have, or can buy, more tax
expertise, or have more political clout to obtain advantageous tax incentives.
Zimmerman (1983) did indeed find, as he expected, a positive effect of company
size on ETRs. However, his findings were disputed by Porcano (1986) who found a
negative effect on ETRs of company size. Wilkie and Limberg (1990) subsequently
reconciled these different findings by pointing out relevant differences in the
research designs of Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986). Among them were
differences in ETR definitions.
In a contemporaneous paper, Omer, Molloy, and Ziebart (1991) make a
similar methodological contribution. In a later paper, Shevlin and Porter (1992),
after taking into account Wilkie and Limberg's (1990) remarks, still report the
finding of progressive company income taxes, albeit in a univariate framework.
Holland (1998) finds a positive size effect for the UK for a number of years in his
twenty-six year period. However, he also finds a few years with negative size
effects.
5.2.2.2 Of/ier determ/wartta awc/cow/ro/
Neither Zimmerman (1983), nor Porcano (1986) studied the variation in
ETRs in a multivariate framework. However, there are more company
characteristics potentially influencing tax incentives to companies. This point was
made early on by Stickney and McGee (1982), and more recently by Gupta and
Newberry (1997). Capital structure (i.e., leverage) can inversely affect ETRs (i.e.,
lower ETRs) because interest expenses are tax deductible, whereas dividends are
not. Also, asset mix may impact ETRs inversely because tax incentives are often
granted for capital investment: investment credits or favorable tax depreciation
schedules. Stickney and McGee (1982), using US data, have looked at both
leverage and capital intensity in a multivariate framework and found the effects
expected. Interestingly, in their multivariate analysis they found no effect for
company size. Gupta and Newberry (1997) used several asset mix variables and
leverage in their multiple regression model explaining variability of ETRs. They
also found the effects expected. Again, their results did not show a company size
effect in a multivariate framework. Stickney and McGee (1982) also included
the extent of foreign operations of a company as an explanatory variable. The
extent of foreign operations influences ETRs, for instance in the US context,
through tax credits extended for foreign profits earned in more lightly taxed
environments. They indeed found an inverse effect (more foreign operations, lower
ETRs). Gupta and Newberry did not include this variable. Stickney and McGee
(1982) also investigated the impact of industry on ETRs. They found that certain
US industries (natural resources) are treated more favorably tax-wise.
34Because the focus in ETR research is on the cross-sectional distribution of
tax incentives granted to companies, equation (3) suggests the use of company
profitability as a control variable. Gupta and Newberry (1997) include return on
total assets (ROA) in their model and document the expected positive (higher ROA,
higher ETR) effect.
Other control variables suggested in the literature are a financial accounting
loss (NOL) and a negative tax expense (NTE). NOLs proxy for negative taxable
income. Negative taxable income creates a tax shield lowering ETRs in different
years. NOLs will directly confound the company size effect on ETRs, when larger
companies (i.e., more diversified companies) profit less from this type of tax shield.
Furthermore, NOLs will also indirectly confound the company size effect, as
suggested by Wang (1991). Also, NOL and NTE can lead to negative ETRs, which
are difficult to interpret. The occurrence of both NOL and NTE will lead to positive
ETRs. In this chapter firm-year observations with NOLs and/or NTEs are dropped
from the sample, in line with (part of) the literature. Sensitivity analyses for a
sample including NOL/NTE observations is provided in section 3.5.3.2.
Equation (3) also suggests that tax rate changes will affect ETRs. Gupta and
Newberry (1997) look at the effect of tax reform in the US in 1986 (the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, TRA86) in the area of company income tax, by estimating their ETR
model for a panel of companies pre-TRA86 and post-TRA86. Shevlin and Porter
(1992) also investigate the effect of TRA86 on ETRs, and furthermore complement
the measurement of ETRs by decomposing the observed changes into an income
effect, a tax rate effect, and a tax rule effect.
So far the determinants of the cross-section of ETRs used in previous
research carry over to the Dutch context. A particular feature of the Dutch financial
reporting system (not present in the US) is that both public" (listed) and private
(non-listed) companies above a certain threshold have to file their financial
statements. This creates the opportunity to investigate a fuller set of determinants
that have been suggested in the literature. Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock (1996) and Mills
and Newberry (2001) suggest that public companies have larger book-tax income
differences because public companies have more costs^ from reporting low book
income compared to tax income. In other words, for public companies it is more
important to report high book income, and managers of these companies are less
likely to consider tax decisions directly (Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock 1996, p. 34).
Public companies are thus expected to have lower ETRs.
" Public companies are defined in this chapter as those Dutch companies that are listed on a stock
exchange.
"' Such costs include lower management compensation, lower market value of the company, and
debt covenant violations (Mills and Newberry 2001).
353.2.3 Development of hypotheses
The discussion in the previous section motivates the following hypotheses. The
hypotheses are stated with direction where possible. Precise variable definitions
(e.g., in terms of REACH A mnemonics) will be given in sections 3.4.3.1 and
3.4.3.2. Additional Dutch context motivation is given where appropriate.
Previous research relating company size to ETRs usually found conflicting
results. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated without sign. In the Netherlands, the
possibility of defining a fiscal unity (parent/subsidiaries) within a company is more
likely to be used in larger companies since they will have more subsidiaries. Also
favorable tax rulings in the Netherlands may be more likely for larger companies as
well as certain investment incentives. On the other hand, certain investment
incentives in the Netherlands may accrue disproportionally more to smaller
companies.
/// Cowparty £T/?s are /•e/a/etf' to cowpcrm' size.
Previous research, notably Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Stickney and
McGee (1982), has found an inverse relationship between capital intensity and
ETRs, due to tax incentives associated with investments in fixed assets, notably
accelerated depreciation provisions. The Netherlands allows companies to
depreciate fixed assets on a liberal basis. Also, there are tax incentives for
investments in fixed assets. Therefore, an inverse relationship can be expected.
//2 Co/wpawy £T/?s are /«verse/v re/a/ea" to ca/?/7a/ /wte/w/ity
The Netherlands has a system of participation exemptions for subsidiary
income which specifically also applies to foreign subsidiaries. In effect the
Netherlands has a territorial corporate income tax system (see, te Spenke 1995,
section 4.5.1). Depending on the weighted average of foreign income to net income
and the relevant foreign statutory tax rates, company ETRs will be positively or
negatively related to the extent of foreign operations.
//i Co/M/?awy £T/?j are re/a/ea* to r/ie exfew/ o/yöre/gw opera/zorts (jfore/gw
sa/es/tota/
Wilkie (1988) argues that tax incentives are associated with company
characteristics, such as capital intensity, but also with income. Gupta and Newberry
(1997) expand Wilkie's argument and argue for the inclusion of a profitability
measure. They find support for this association. Most Dutch tax incentives do not
seem to be related to profitability, therefore a sign for this hypothesis is not stated.
36//4 Company £T/fa are re/a/ea" to pro/i/a6/7//y fretorn on
Interest costs are tax deductible, whereas dividend is not. Thus companies
with more leverage (and high interest expenses) are expected to have lower ETRs.
//5 Company £77?.? are /nverse/y re/a/ea" to /everage.
As explained earlier, public companies have more incentives than private
companies to report higher (nonconforming) book income compared to taxable
income. Thus public companies are expected to have lower ETRs.
//6 Company £T/?s are tower yörpwW/c companies.
For hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 no expectation of direction is stated. Since there
was no important corporate income tax rate or tax rule change in the Netherlands in
the 1994-1999 period, there is no need to formulate a tax rate/tax rule effect
hypothesis.
3.2.4 Discussion
One problematic aspect of average ETR research is the issue of the definition of the
average ETR. As mentioned above, empirical outcomes may depend on specific
definitions of the ETR. Wilkie and Limberg (1993) go so far as suggesting an
alternative tax incentives variable, tax subsidy on equity (TSE). This measure
presumes corporate income taxes are related to stockholder's equity. Corporate
income taxes are, however, based on income. This chapter will therefore not use
TSE. The definition of the ETR variables will be defined in section 3.4.3.2.
Some authors have used an ETR variable based on pre-tax operating cash
flow as denominator, notably Zimmerman (1983). The idea behind this is to correct
for the effect of financial accounting method choices that may be interrelated to the
explanatory variables of the ETR. This chapter also uses a cash flow based ETR
measure in this paper.
373.3 ETRs, the financial accounting treatment of company income tax in The
Netherlands, and the relevant statutory company tax rate
3.3.1 Financial accounting treatment of company income tax in the Netherlands
The only sources of data readily available to researchers outside the company (apart
from the tax authorities) for the calculation of company ETRs are published
financial statements. Financial statements are used in this chapter to calculate
company ETRs in the Netherlands. The use of financial statements for the
calculation of ETRs requires consideration of the financial accounting treatment of
company income taxes. Dutch financial accounting practices are affected by
financial accounting legislation and by financial accounting standard setting by the
Council on Annual Reporting ("Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving", RJ). While Dutch
companies are obliged to follow the existing legal financial accounting
requirements, RJ financial accounting standards are not obligatory in the data
period examined (van der Tas 1998)\ There are both legal requirements and RJ
standards for the financial accounting treatment of company income taxes .
Differences between financial accounting income and taxable income for a
given year for companies arise in countries where there is independence in the
determination of these two types of company income. Such independence exists in
the Netherlands. Companies in the Netherlands are required to use interperiod tax
allocation to deal with temporary differences between financial accounting income
and taxable income. Of course, both permanent and temporary differences are
possible in this context. When the effect of permanent differences on the tax rate
implied by the income tax expense is "considerable", the reasons for such
permanent differences have to be explained in the financial statements notes
section.
Temporary differences require the use of deferred taxes, which leads to
deferred tax assets, and more typically to deferred tax liabilities. Separate
identification of the current deferred tax expense in the income statement is not
required. Hence, the current deferred tax expense can only be approximated by
calculating the annual change in the deferred tax liability. Comprehensive
allocation is required, and while using the present value of tax liabilities is allowed,
almost always the nominal value is shown by Dutch companies. Finally, use of the
liability method is required.
A recent discussion in English of financial reporting regulation for income
tax accounting in the Netherlands is Hoogendoorn (1996b). The most recent survey
of company practice in this area is van der Gaar and van der Tas (1991, in Dutch)
for the year 1989. A recent exhaustive and clear treatment of income tax accounting
* See, ZefT, van der Wel, and CamfTerman (1992) for an insightful history of Dutch financial
reporting regulation and for a description of the current situation.
Dutch financial reporting law and RJ standards are available in English in Guidelines (1999).
38in the Netherlands is Kampschoer (1997, in Dutch; a more recent version is in
Kampschoer 2001), who gives exact references to legal requirements and relevant
RJ standards. The survey research of van der Gaar and van der Tas (1991) shows
that Dutch companies generally stay close to the RJ standards, on a voluntary basis.
3.3.2 Relevant statutory corporate income tax rate
The analyses are based on data for the years 1994 to 1999, as there are no important
Dutch corporate tax law changes during this period. Specifically, during this period
the corporate income tax rates in the Netherlands were as follows: 40 per cent of the
first Hfl. 100,000/€ 45,378 (prior to July 1994: Hfl. 250.000/6 113,445) and 35 per
cent of the excess above that amount (te Spenke, 1995, p. 112)*. For all practical
purposes, the statutory tax rate (STR) for the larger Dutch companies in the sample
(see below) was around 35 percent in the 1994 - 1999 period.
3.4 Research methods: data, sample, model, and variables
3.4.1 The /?£•,*C7/ data file
The sample in this chapter consists of companies whose financial statements were
taken from the 2001 (release 63) CD-ROM #£>*C// A data file for the period 1994-
1999, the most recent period available on that CD-ROM, but also a period during
which there were no important tax rule changes. The 7?£4C// A data file is
produced from financial statements of companies filing financial statements in the
Netherlands with the local Chamber of Commerce registry.
The company producing the Ä/L4C7/ A data file takes financial statements
and transfers information from these to its own "model" format of financial
statements of which there are two types: an abbreviated model format and a
complete model format. The existence of two formats is a consequence of the fact
that Dutch financial reporting regulation has several disclosure regimes. The
Ä£/4C// A complete model format corresponds to the disclosure regime for the
largest companies. All items in the /?£/!C// A complete model format are identified
with a name and number identification. These identifications are used below to
define the variables used in this paper.
3.4.2 Sample selection
This chapter only uses data for companies for which financial statements are
available in the 7JE4C7/ detailed model format. Five groups of observations in the
' In 1996 the 40% tax rate was lowered to 37% and in 1997 to 36%. For 1998 and 1999 35% is
the uniform corporate income tax rate in the Netherlands.
39sample were deleted. Deleted were (i) non-trade and industry companies, (ii)
companies with a special status, (iii) dependent companies , (iv) companies not
having the public limited ("NV") or private limited ("BV") legal form, (v)
investment funds, and (vi) NOL/NTE firm-years.
The first group was deleted as these companies have a differing financial
reporting format. Special status companies were deleted as these do not report
regular financial statements. Dependent companies are deleted as they are taxed at a
(possibly differing) foreign tax rate. Non-incorporated companies as well as
investment funds are not subject to the regular corporate tax regulations and were
therefore excluded from the sample. Based on the discussion in section 3.2.2.2
NOL/NTE observations are deleted.
Finally, to create the 1994-1999 sample only those companies were retained
for which sufficient data was available to calculate the ETR measures (see below
for the variable definitions). This resulted in a final sample of 1,592 companies. A
summary of the way the final sample was arrived at is given in Table 1.
The subsequent analyses are based on those companies that report data for all
relevant variables. Of the 1,592 companies, 1,041/967 companies (respectively










1 Sample selection criteria
Description
Trade and industry companies on /?£.•!C7/ (detailed
statements)
And not companies with a special status
And not dependent companies
And not non-incorporated companies
And not investment funds














3.4.3 Multivariate model and variable definitions
The following model is used to test the hypotheses. This model will be
estimated for ETR 1 and ETR 2.
ETR,i = a,; + ß,FSIZE„+ ß,CAPINT,i + p3FOREIGN,,+ ß4ROA,i + 65
ß„PUBLIC,i + e,i (4)
t is a firm-year between 1994 and 1999
i is an individual company from the firm-years sample
' This effectively also eliminates non-consolidated financial statements.
40The following control variables relating to operating losses and negative tax
expenses are used in the sensitivity analyses (see section 3.5.3.2):
NOL,i; NTE,i; NOL*NTE,|; NOL*FSIZE,j; NTE*FSIZE,j
The variable codings represent the following variables. ETR is effective tax
rate 1 or 2 (see below for explanation of ETR 1 and ETR 2). FSIZE is company
size, defined as natural logarithm of total assets (in /?£>IC7/ A mnemonics: natural
logarithm of item 1230). Capital intensity (CAPINT) is defined as tangible fixed
assets divided by total assets (in /?£>1C7/ A mnemonics: item 1090 divided by item
1230). FOREIGN" proxies for the extent of international activities and is defined as
net foreign sales over net sales (in /?£>1C7/ A mnemonics: item 1233 divided by
item 1003). Return on assets (ROA) is defined as net earnings divided by total
assets (in /?iL4C7/ A mnemonics: item 1055 divided by item 1230). LEVERAGE is
the company's leverage, defined as long term liabilities divided by total assets (in
fl£/lC// A mnemonics: item 1189 divided by item 1230). PUBLIC is the dummy
variable indicating a public company.
Financial accounting loss (NOL) is defined as a dummy variable being 1
when the company experiences a financial accounting loss for the current year (in
ÄE/1C//A mnemonics: if item 1055 <0 then NOL = 1; otherwise NOL = 0). NTE
stands for negative tax expense, a dummy variable being 1 when the company
reports a negative tax expense (in /?£4CY/ A mnemonics: if item 1056 < 0 then
NTE = 1; otherwise NTE = 0). NOL*NTE is a dummy variable being 1 when the
company experiences both a NOL as well as a NTE (in Ä£/fC// A mnemonics: if
item 1055 <0ancf item 1056 < 0 then NOL*NTE = 1; otherwise NOL*NTE = 0).
NOL*FSIZE is an interaction variable for financial accounting loss and company
size with NTE*FSIZE being an interaction variable for negative tax expense and
company size. Finally, a is the intercept with e being the error term.
As Dutch financial reporting requirements only require disclosure of deferred
tax liabilities, but not deferred tax assets, only deferred tax liabilities in the ETR
definitions are used. Furthermore, as the tax expense accrues to the entire income in
the Dutch context the current tax expense is used as well as full financial
accounting income before interest and taxes in the ETR measures.
To control for possible differences in financial reporting between companies,
this chapter also uses an alternative ETR definition, based on cash flow. The ETR
definitions are (also see chapter 2 where a different approach was used):
This variable shows a relatively large number of cases with missing data. This is likely related
to companies with no or immaterial amounts of foreign sales not reporting this item. Such
missing data are recoded "0". All subsequent analyses are based on this recoded variable.
Appendix 1 provides information showing the effects of this recoding.
41(1056-(1178, -1178, ,))
"- HÜÖ4 ~
being: the ratio of (tax expense - (deferred tax provision,- deferred tax provision, |))
over earnings before interest and taxes.
(1056-(1178, -1178, ,))
FTR2 = - - ? t-1 ''
(1254-(1034-1055))
being: the ratio of (tax expense - (deferred tax provision,- deferred tax provision,^))
over (cash flow - (earnings before interest and taxes - earnings before interest) in
terms of /?£/lC7/ A item identification items.
Both ETR measures include interest expenses in the denominator because
leverage is used as explanatory variable in subsequent analyses.
3.4.5.5 &/i'ffiflf/on ProceJwre
To investigate model (4), stated in section 3.4.3.1, an OLS regression model
is estimated to assess the relationship between determinants and ETR.
The analyses in this chapter are based on pooled firm-year (FY) observations
for the period 1994-1999. Results from such statistical analyses may be affected by
serial correlation in the data. To facilitate comparison between the pooled sample
and the annual samples, the appendices include annual descriptive and annual OLS
regression results.
Additionally, to investigate possible nonlinear relationships between
determinants and ETRs as well as to control for the non-normal distribution of
financial accounting data, a rank regression model (RR/* is used to estimate the
multivariate model. Below the OLS and RR results are reported. To test for
nonlinear relationships the parametric variables are classified in deciles in the RR
(Fama and French 1996).
As ETR ratios can easily result in extreme values, ETR 1 and ETR 2 are
filtered at two standard deviations from the mean (see, for instance, Anderson,
Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). This reduced firm-year observations involving
ETR 1 by 1.40% and firm-year observations involving ETR 2 by 0.50%. Final
ETR 1/ETR 2 samples numbered 4,097/3,814 firm-years (down from 4,155/3,833
firm-years for the unfiltered sample).
* More information on this particular type of linear models is available in Greene (2002) and
Neter, Kutner. Nachtsheim, and Wasserman (1996). Callihan and White (1999), and Lang and
Lundholm (1996) use a comparable technique called monotonic regression. More information on
this method is available in Conover (1980), and Conover and Iman (1981).
423.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive and univariate results
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for both ETR measures of the pooled firm-
year observations for the 1994-1999 period. Table 2 shows that the mean and
median ETRs are somewhat below the statutory tax rate of 35%. However, standard
deviation and interquartile range show considerable variation between companies in
the sample. The cash flow based ETR2 measure descriptive statistics tend to be
lower for central tendency measures with a larger dispersion around these measures.
Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics for the pooled sample (also for the
unfiltered sample as this shows the effect of filtering).



















For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive univariate tests of the hypotheses. Table 4
does that separately for the PUBLIC dummy variable. Table 3 shows ETR 1 and
ETR 2 means, medians, and standard deviation for quartiles of company size,
capital intensity, relative importance of foreign sales, ROA, and leverage. Quartiles
are in increasing order for the explanatory variables. The numbers in bold report the
number of firm-year observations. Table 3 does not document consistent
relationships across both ETR measures between company characteristics and ETR
levels. As far as individual relationships are discemable these appear to be limited
to one or two quartiles (e.g., ETR2 and CAPINT), but not the complete distribution.
43Table 3 Results for univariate descriptive statistics: mean and median ETRs for






















































































































































































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
For the dummy variable PUBLIC, ETR1 and ETR2 are given in Table 4,
divided for two subsets of companies, corresponding with the value 0 or 1 of
PUBLIC. Again, the bold numbers indicate the number of firm-years observations.
The results indicate that public companies have slightly lower ETRs, both for ETR1
and ETR2, although this effect is small.


































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
Descriptive statistics for the FOREIGN variable are only provided for the non-zero
observations.
44Table 5 shows correlations between ETR measures and the explanatory
variables and between explanatory variables themselves". The lower left panel
reports ETR1 correlations, whereas the upper right panel reports ETR2 correlations.
Table 5, first, provides further univariate results supplementing the results in
Tables 3 and 4. The correlation between the two ETR measures and the explanatory
variables are mostly insignificant, and when significant, small. Only ROA is
significantly, albeit at a low level, related to ETR1. ETR2 is significantly related at
a low level to CAPINT.
Table 5 Pearson correlations for ETR determinants (FY are 4,097 and

























































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed)
**: significant at 1 percent level (two-tailed)
Table 5 also shows, in general, not very high correlations between the
company characteristics themselves, which should not create multicollinearity
problems. A multivariate analysis is provided in the next section.
3.5.2 OLS regression results
Table 6 summarizes the OLS regression results for model (4), using the pooled
data'" sample for the 1994-1999 period. The results indicate that the overall
explanatory power of model (4) is statistically significant for ETR 1 and 2 at the 1%
level, though with very low adjusted R-square numbers. The CAPINT and LEV
variables are significant in both ETR models, but LEV with the wrong sign. A
possible explanation for this relationship is that companies with high levels of
leverage, have relatively lower levels of pre-tax accounting income compared to
taxable income, thus increasing ETR levels. Overall, the amount of variance in
ETR 1/2 captured by the variables is small. So, the variances in ETR measures
Nonparametric correlations using Spearman's rho are reported in appendix 3. The parametric
(Pearson) and nonparametric correlations (Spearman) are similar.
'" Annual (filtered) regression results for the sample period 1994-1999 are included in appendix
4. The annual results indicate a lower significance of the company characteristics and a better fit
of the ETR2 model compared to the ETR1 model. Based on the annual results only ROA in the
ETR2 model is significant in all years.
45cannot be very well explained.
Although ETR 1 and ETR 2 appear to measure the same effective tax rate
(see Table 2), they are related somewhat differently to company characteristics. A
partial explanation for these differences is the larger dispersion of the cash flow
based ETR measure.








































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
*•: significant at 1%-level (two-sided)
3.5.3 Sensitivity analyses
i.5.3. /
To control for possible nonlinear relationships between company
characteristics and ETR levels, a RR is used, with the variables classified into
deciles. The results for this model are reported in Table 7.
"Fama and French (2000) adjust their t-values as their data have high first-order autocorrelation
(around 0.5). The first-order autocorrelation (not reported) in this chapter approximates 0, thus
not necessitating the need for adjustment of t-values. Analyses of the regression errors (not
reported) support this conclusion.





















































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
**: significant at 1%-level (two-sided)
(-): indicates a negative relationship between this variable and ETR 1/2 in the RR model.
The results indicate that both ETR 1 and ETR 2 RRs are significant. The
explanatory power of the ETR1 model is still quite low, whereas the explanatory
power of the ETR2 model has increased considerably. Again the CAPINT and LEV
variables (LEV again with the wrong sign) are significant at the 1%-level for both
ETR1 and ETR2 models.
5.5.3.2 O/Aer se/w/7zv/7v
This section provides additional sensitivity analyses investigating the
influence of (i) deleting NOL/NTE firm-years, (ii) deferred taxes, (iii) using a
balanced panel, and (iv) industry effects. For each sensitivity analysis discussion is
provided.
The analyses so far have used a sample excluding NOL/NTE firm-year
observations. To the extent that this exclusion might influence the results, appendix
5 provides analyses for a dataset including the NOL/NTE firm-years, first using
model (4), but second also including control variables as mentioned in section
3.4.3.1. The analyses are performed for both OLS and RR models. The results of
the additional analyses concur with the findings in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
The statistical analyses so far have only used current taxes in the ETR 1/2
measure. To investigate whether deferred taxes impact the statistical analyses, tax
expenses statistics for ETR 1/ETR 2 are calculated using the total tax expenses (i.e.,
current tax expense plus deferred tax charge). Descriptive statistics and OLS
regression results for these total ETRs are reported in appendix 6. Total ETR results
suggest that total ETRs are similar to regular ETR 1/2 definitions. OLS regression
results for total ETRs are not consistently different from regular ETR 1/2
definitions.
47The empirical results so far have been determined using a firm-years sample
to provide the largest possible sample. A firm-years sample can include various
categories of companies, including new and defaulting companies that often report
extreme data. A balanced panel (which requires observations for all years for each
company of the sample) may include "cleaner" (i.e., less extreme) data. Therefore,
descriptive analyses and OLS regression using a balanced panel are also performed
(reported in appendix 7). The results suggest that the balanced panel results for
OLS regression are similar to the firm-years sample regression results. ETR levels
of the balanced panel sample are almost identical to the firm-years sample.
Tax incentives do not necessarily have to be related to company
characteristics, they can also be related to specific industries. To investigate this
possible relationship, all industries (using BIK. codes'"*) were selected with more
than 75 firm-years observations available. For these industries, mean and median
ETR 1/2 were calculated. These data are reported in appendix 8.
Apart from companies in BIK code 501042 (automobile retail), the selected
industries reveal no structural differences from the mean and median for the entire
sample. This confirms the other findings, which, in general, show small differences
between ETR 1/2 and statutory tax rates.
3.6 Summary and conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to attempt to investigate the extent of horizontal equity
of Dutch corporate income taxes. Six company characteristics were used to explain
effective tax rates (ETRs) for a cross-sectional firm-years sample of Dutch
companies for the years 1994 to 1999. The company characteristics include
company size, capital intensity, extent of foreign operations, company performance,
leverage and being a public company.
The empirical results indicate that the Dutch corporate tax system provides
relatively small amounts of tax incentives to companies. As far as these tax
incentives can be related to company characteristics, the explained variation in
ETR 1/2 levels is small. These results point to the conclusion that the Dutch
government provides limited tax incentives that mostly are difficult to explain with
the investigated company characteristics in this chapter.
'•* The BIK system is the standard classification system used by the Dutch Chambers of
Commerce.
48appendices
1 Foreign sales variable: the effect of recoding ~
Results of descriptive statistics for recoded foreign sales and not-recoded foreign sales









































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
49Pooled sample



















































































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
50Correlations
Spearman correlations for ETR determinants (FY are 4,097 and 3,814 for ETR1/ETR2


























































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed)
**: significant at 1 percent level (two-tailed)
514 Annual OLS regression results for the sample period 1994-1999

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
**: significant at 1%-level (two-sided)
and 3.4.3.2.
54Sample including NOL/NTE firm-years
OLS regression model test results for ETR 1/ETR 2 including NOL/NTE firm-years






































































OLS regression test results for ETR 1/ETR 2 including NOL/NTE firm-years and












































































































55RR model test results for ETR 1/ETR 2 including NOL/NTE firm-years (ETR 1/2 FY





















































RR test results for ETR 1/ETR 2 (filtered), including NOL/NTE firm-years and control















































































(-): indicates a negative relationship between this variable and ETR 1/2 in the RR model.
For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
**: significant at 1%-level (two-sided)
56Total ETRs






























































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
•*: significant at 1%-level (two-sided)
57Balanced panel





















OLS regression test results for ETR 1/ETR 2 (filtered) for balanced panel data (ETR 1/2







































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
*: significant at 5%-level (two-sided)
































































For variable definitions see sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2.
5960chapter 4
Implicit Taxes in the Corporate Sector:
Evidence for the European Union
4.1 Introduction
Tax legislators (governments) continuously provide tax incentives to various
classes of targeted companies to induce these companies to alter their operating,
investing, or financing decisions with the effect of reallocating resources towards
outcomes that the governments prefer as part of their economic policy (Hines
1997).
Providing tax incentives to targeted companies may lead to differences in tax
burdens between companies, i.e., companies are treated unequally corporate tax-
wise. Most previous tax accounting research studied differences in tax burdens by
focusing on the average effective tax rate (ETR) measure (Shackelford and Shevlin
2001). ETRs are defined as (current) tax charge (derived from the company's
financial statements) divided by pre-tax financial accounting income (Callihan
1994). Thus, ETRs measure the amount of (explicit) taxes payable by the company,
as a fraction of pre-tax accounting income (see also chapters 2 and 3).
However, this research has tended to overlook the fact that differences
in explicit tax rates must, due to competition in the various markets a company
operates in, lead to implicit taxes. Implicit taxes are the differences between pre-tax
returns on fully taxed investments and the pre-tax returns on partially or tax-exempt
risk-adjusted investments (Scholes and Wolfson 1992, Wilkie 1992)'. In fact, lower
explicit taxes will thus lead to higher implicit taxes and vice versa'. Therefore,
studying tax burdens should focus on total taxes across companies, both explicit
' A real-life example of implicit taxes would be the deducibility of interest costs of mortgage
loans for personal income tax purposes in the Netherlands. This deductibility has eventually
led to an increase in the prices of houses compared to neighboring countries which do not
have such a facility. These higher prices can be attributed to the effect of implicit taxes.
" Absent of market frictions and risk differences (Scholes and Wolfson 1992).
61and implicit tax burdens.
Only a relatively small number of earlier studies have investigated
implicit taxes. The present chapter will focus on implicit taxes in the corporate
sector in the European Union (EU).
This chapter investigates a fuller set of implicit tax affecting variables. Not
only are tax incentives investigated as an implicit tax creating variable, but also
product and factor market competition vulnerability as variables impacting the
lower (higher) before-tax returns of tax (dis)favoured companies.
The results in this chapter indicate that implicit taxes play an important role
in explaining differences in pre-tax financial accounting returns across the
European Union. The strength of the negative relationship is close to the expected
(theoretical) value of 1. Furthermore, the results also provide significant support for
the relevance of the proxies for product and factor market competition in
explaining levels of implicit taxes and for differences in statutory tax rates
impacting levels of pre-tax returns between countries.
In paragraph two of this chapter, previous research will be addressed along
with the hypotheses. Paragraph three specifies the model and data used in this
study. Paragraph four will address the empirical analyses of the hypotheses. Finally,
paragraph five will provide a conclusion.
4.2 Background and hypotheses
4.2.1 Background
Previous empirical tax accounting research has only assessed the empirical
importance of implicit taxes to a limited degree. The theoretical framework of
implicit taxes was developed by Scholes and Wolfson (1992). This framework was
used to develop the model used in earlier research and in this chapter. Empirical
studies that use this framework either investigate specific or corporate settings.
Published research in corporate settings'* is in Wilkie (1992) and Callihan and
White (1999). Corporate setting research was initiated by Wilkie (1992). This
chapter has a corporate setting.
When discussing implicit taxes, the most important notion is the tax incentive
concept. Tax incentives are cross-sectional and intertemporal differences in the
companies' exclusions, deductions, and other items that cause taxable income to
diverge from pre-tax economic income (Wilkie 1988; see also earlier chapters). Due
to the existence of positive (i.e., decreasing taxable income) or negative tax
' These variables proxy for the effect of market frictions in reducing the implicit taxes
relationship.
•* Examples of studies in specific settings can be found in section 3.3 of Shackelford and Shevlin
(2001).
62incentives, implicit taxes arise, since the marketplace will bid up (bid down) the
prices of tax-favoured (disfavoured) investments, and thereby lower (increase) the
pre-tax investments' returns (Scholes and Wolfson 1992). Thus, implicit taxes are
not paid (directly) to the tax authorities, but by the beneficiaries of the tax
incentive(s) to capital, factor and product market agents (Frank 1994, Stiglitz 1997)
who receive (part of) these incentives while the intended beneficiaries end up
receiving a lower pre-tax return.
Implicit taxes on investments are defined as the difference between the
before-tax return on a fully taxable investment and the before-tax return on a not-
fully taxed alternative investment in competitive markets (Scholes and Wolfson
1992). Since investors will demand higher returns for riskier investments, the
proposition is about risk adjusted returns.
Generally speaking, an investor will thus not only pay explicit taxes, but also
implicit taxes. In a competitive setting, there should be a perfectly negative (risk-
adjusted) association between explicit and implicit taxes. The total taxes for an
investment, that is explicit taxes plus implicit taxes, should be equal across
investments over time (when controlling for risk differences), otherwise tax
arbitrage possibilities will exist (Scholes and Wolfson 1992). Such tax arbitrage
possibilities would lead to abnormal returns, which are not sustainable in the long
rW(Goolsbee 1998, Schererand Ross 1990).
In the first paper to test this theoretical framework on implicit taxes in a
corporate setting, Wilkie (1992) has empirically tested the implicit tax hypothesis
by investigating the relationship between pre-tax return on equity (as proxy for pre-
tax economic income) and the pre-tax equivalent of tax incentives'' on equity (as
proxy for tax incentives). He finds a consistent and statistically significant negative
relation between pre-tax return and tax incentives. However, the actual relationship
found was weaker than hypothesised by the implicit tax hypothesis for a
competitive market (the coefficient should be -1). But, Wilkie (1992) did not
control for factors that cause tax incentives to 'leak away'. This omission affects
the understanding why the relationship is as reported by Wilkie (1992).
A small number of other studies have also, to some extent, studied implicit
taxes in a corporate setting. In an earlier study, Wilkie (1988) found that "ETR
variations are caused by differences in both tax incentives and income whenever tax
incentives and income are not perfectly correlated", thereby providing support for
the implicit tax hypothesis.
Recent published research in the corporate setting is in Callihan and White
(1999). Not only is the existence of implicit taxes investigated, Callihan and White
also use the company's market power as a proxy for product market frictions. They
On the other hand, tax arbitrage is limited by the related fixed and marginal costs (Erickson,
Goolsbee, and Maydew 2002).
* Wilkie (1992) uses the expression "tax subsidies", but in line with the other chapters, this
chapter uses "tax incentives" throughout.
63find support for the existence of implicit taxes (a negative relationship between
level of tax incentives and pre-tax returns) as well as for product market structure
imperfections negatively impacting the implicit taxes relationship. Callihan and
White (1999) indicate that differences in factor markets might also affect the level
of implicit taxes, but note their own lack of focus on these factor markets (i.e., input
markets) mainly due to lack of data.
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) provide an overview of research on implicit
taxes in both specific settings as well as in corporate settings.
Summarising the existing implicit tax accounting literature, previous studies
on implicit taxes in the corporate sector have found evidence relating to the implicit
tax hypothesis as set forth by Scholes and Wolfson (1992). These studies have also
found limited evidence for factors influencing the implicit tax relationship. The
scope of these studies is limited as they only (i) use data on the US corporate setting
and (ii) take only partial account of implicit tax causing variables. These limitations
are addressed in this chapter. That is, this chapter (a) compares the implicit tax
relationship between European Union countries, and (b) includes both product
market and factor market proxies to capture variables influencing the implicit tax
relationship. The next paragraph describes three specific aspects relating to the
research design in this chapter: (i) market frictions, specifically product and factor
market frictions, (ii) tax rate differences within and between the European Union
member states, and (iii) risk differences.
4.2.2 Hypotheses
4.2.2. / /Vot/wc/ a/jrf/actor /nar£e/./Wcf/ow.s.
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) demonstrate that in a fully competitive market
risk-adjusted after-tax economic returns will equalize (see also Fama and French
(2000) and Stigler (1963)). If governments impose differing taxes" on such returns,
the before-tax economic returns will reflect the "implicit taxes", that is lower
(higher) before-tax economic returns equivalent to the lower (higher) corporate
taxation. To test this hypothesis in a corporate setting Wilkie (1992) examined the
relationship between pre-tax return on equity (PTROE) (a proxy for before-tax
economic return) and pre-tax equivalent of tax incentives received on equity
(PTTIE)''. Wilkie's (1992) results show the expected significant negative
relationship between PTROE and PTTIE in the US corporate setting. Wilkie (1992)
' This study does not include proxies for capital and entrepreneurship markets (Frank 1994) as
variables potentially affecting the implicit tax relationship, due to the measurement and
availability problems associated with these variables. Goolsbee (1998) provides a useful example
of a capital market proxy, which is, however, not available in this setting.
* Including differences in tax rates, but also in taxable incomes, deductions, etc.
' Wilkie (1992) defines PTTIE as the ratio of tax incentives (pre-tax income multiplied by the
highest statutory tax rate, minus current tax expense) to stockholders' equity, divided by one
minus the highest statutory tax rate.
64uses a financial statement based accounting measure (PTROE) as a proxy for
economic income. Due to the absence of economic income measures, accounting
measures are also used in this chapter.
In the EU corporate setting, this implicit tax relationship is expected to
hold'", stated in hypothesis one:
/// 77zere w a «egaz7ve /-e/aZ/ow^A/p 6ezwe/z P77?0£ a«t/ />7T/£.
Callihan and White (1999) follow up on Wilkie's (1992) research,
incorporating differences in product market competition as explanation for the non-
unity relationship Wilkie (1992) found. A limitation in their study is the lack of
control for differences in factor market competition (Callihan and White 1999).
Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 206) state that both high (low) factor market
competition and low (high) product market competition relate to higher (lower)
after-tax profitability levels, because such differences in competition cannot be
fully mitigated by arbitrage.
In this chapter, both the influence of differences in product and factor market
competition is investigated, as well as the combined effect of product/factor market
competition and PTTIE on the PTROE levels. The factor market consists of two
important submarkets: the labour and supplier market. Proxies for both submarkets
are included in this study. Hypothesis two and three a and b state the expected
relationship.
77zere z's a wore /legafz've /-e/a/7o«.s/jz/j ftezweew P77?0£ aw</ P777£ yb
" co/w/?ez7z7o/r
//Ja 7Yzere z's a /wore wega/zve re/cr/zons/z//? /jezwee/z P77?0£ a/zdP7T/£yör
co/w/>am'es evpeWewcz'wg /ow /aftow/' /war^ez co/w/?ez7'z7o/z.
//J/3 7Vze/r z's a /wore «egazzve re/a//o/?j/zz/? /3ezwen P77?O£ a/zd P777£/br
eA75e/-zencz/7g /OH- swp/?/z'e/- mar^e/ co/wpe/zz'zo/j.
The reason for the opposite relations in hypotheses 2 and 3 is that in
situations of low product market competition, the companies can earn higher after
tax returns and thus "hold on" to the tax incentives, whereas in situations of low
factor market competition, factor market agents (i.e., employees and suppliers) will
"force" the companies to "give up" their tax incentives.
4.2.2.2 7av raze
In contrast to the US setting, the EU offers a wide variety of taxable incomes
'" As the EU is more diverse than the U.S. in terms of accounting, economic, and legal
differences, hypothesis 1 is expected to be less strong in the EU compared to the U.S.
65that apply differing tax rates. Each EU member state has its own taxable income
and statutory corporate tax rate(s).
Two separate effects can be expected. First, if tax rates'' are higher, this will
raise the cost of capital (Guenther and Willenborg 1999). A higher cost of capital
will in its turn increase entry barriers (Scherer and Ross 1990). In case of higher
entry barriers, fewer market participants will be able to enter the market, thus
increasing the concentration ratio in this particular market and lowering the level of
competition (Scherer and Ross 1990). In situations of decreased competition, as
already explained in relation to hypothesis 2, the arbitrage effect is expected to be
less strong and thus a less strong negative relationship between PTROE and PTTIE
is expected. This effect is supported by the findings of Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux
and Poterba (1983).
Second, if tax rates are higher, this will increase the relative value of tax
incentives to companies. As a result of this, the arbitrage process should be
strengthened and thus a stronger relationship between PTROE and PTTIE is
expected.
For the Netherlands, the hypothesis is stated without direction.
//</ r/iere w a re/a frows//*/? terween P7Y?0£ a«d /TT/f/br co/w/?amey
fax rates.
According to Scholes and Wolfson (1992), risk differences affect the implicit
tax relationship. This necessities risk controls when comparing implicit tax levels
between companies with different risk levels. In the current research design,
implicit and explicit tax levels are investigated per company, thus eliminating the
need for risk controls, as one company will have one overall risk level.
4.3 Research method
4.3.1 Data
Data are collected from the ös/ra database (version 22, October 2002), which
contains financial statement derived data on 27,336 public companies worldwide.
The most recent years available are used in the selection of companies. These are
the years 1995-2000. To select the sample, the following search criteria are used:
'' The standard measure for tax rates is the statutory tax rate (STR) as stated in the applicable tax
laws. Due to differences in taxable incomes, deductions, and the like, effective tax rates (ETRs)
are not similar to STRs. Although research (Bond and Chennells 2000, Devereux 1989, and
Single 1999) indicates that ETRs may be more relevant than STRs in determining the cost of
capital, this study uses the STRs as standard proxy for tax rate differences.




























The selection starts with all companies available on Qy/rä. Then the
companies with their domicile in the EU are selected. Next all financial companies
are deleted because they have a deviating financial statement format. Financial
companies are defined as those companies operating in SIC 60-64 industries'". In
the next step inactive companies ' are deselected. Only companies with a
consolidated statement are selected. These selection steps result in a data sample of
5,703 companies, of which 5,425 companies (23,256 firm-years) remain when the
availability of data'"* for the main model (= model 1, see next section) is checked ".
The subsequent analyses are based on those companies that report data for all
relevant variables. This reduces the firm-years sample from 23,256 to 8,586 firm-
years.
The analyses in this chapter are based on pooled firm-year (FY) observations
for the period 1995-2000. Results from such statistical analyses may be affected by
serial correlation in the data. To facilitate comparison between the pooled sample
and the annual samples, the appendices include annual descriptive and annual OLS
regression results.
4.3.2 Model(s) and variables
From hypothesis 1, a negative relationship between PTROE and PTTIE is expected,
as stated in (1), where i denotes the company subscript en t the time subscript for
one of the years 1995-2000. This relationship was examined by Wilkie (1992) and
Callihan and White (1999).
'" These industries are, SIC 60: depository institutions, SIC 61: nondepository institutions, SIC
62: security and commodity brokers, SIC 63: insurance carriers, and SIC 64: insurance agents,
brokers & service.
" Inactive companies are companies included on the Os/rw database, which do not carry out
active business operations.
'•* The availability of missing data varies per country. The main causes for non-availability of data
are either the non-reporting by companies or the immateriality of such items.
" Of the final 5,425 companies, 5,377 companies are listed on a European Union stock exchange,
and 1,985 companies report model 1 data for all available years.
67e (1)
This model is expanded to include controls for product market competition
differences as such differences affect company profitability and distort the implicit
tax relationship (Scherer and Ross 1990, Scholes and Wolfson 1992). Callihan and
White (1999) used both market share (MS) and market concentration ratio C^ as
proxies for the product market factor. However, due to the limited availability of
the relevant industry sales data in the EU public domain, it is difficult to use these
proxies in this study. Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) provide an alternative
variable to measure the relationship between a company and its customers. They
argue that companies providing (more) unique products are better able to
differentiate themselves from companies with more common products. Such
companies can demand premium prices and achieve higher returns. Bowen et. al.
(1995) propose relative Research & Development (R&D) expenditure (R&D
expense over company size) as proxy for the uniqueness of the product or service.
This study will also use relative R&D expenditure as a proxy for the product market
competition, stated in (2).
PTROE,; = a,, + ß,PTTIE,i + p2PTTIE*R&D,,+ ßiR&D,; + e (2)
The implicit tax relationship is not only affected by product market
competition differences, but also by factor market competition differences (Scherer
and Ross 1990), as such differences impact the relative company profitability. Two
main measures are used to capture factor market competition differences (Scherer
and Ross 1990): material costs and payroll costs'^ A frequently used proxy for
material costs is the capital over sales ratio (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 419).
However, as the Os/ra database contains a 'material expense' (ME) variable, this
variable"* is used. For payroll costs (PC), the 'Salaries and benefits expenses'
measure''* available on Os/rä is used, stated in (3).
PTROE,i = a,; + ß,PTTIE,i + ß2PTTIE*R&D,i+ ß,R&D,i +
ß,ME,i + ß„PTTIE*PC,i + ßyPC.i + e (3)
In this study, the implicit tax relationship is tested across the EU member
states. As these member states apply differing tax rates this has a potential effect on
the implicit tax relationship as higher tax rates lead to lower factor market
competition (Bartelsman and Doms 2000). Here, the statutory tax rate (STR)
'* Concentration index C4 is defined as the cumulative market share of the four largest companies
in four-digit level SIC categories (Callihan and White 1999).
" To take size differences in account, both measures are scaled by a measure of company size.
'* Additional analyses (not reported here) indicate that ME is better able to capture PTROE
differences than the capital over sales ratio.
'" Both measures are comparable to the measures used by Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995).
68differences are used to capture country differences, as well as capturing additional
factor market competition differences. Thus, the statutory tax rates"" are included in
model (4).
PTROE,j = a,; + ßiPTTIE,i + ß2PTTIE*R&D,i+ ßjR&D,j + ß.,PTTIE*ME,i +
ß„PTTIE*PC,i + ß7PC,i + ßsPTTIE*STR,i + ß,STR,i + e (4)
Below, in Table 2, the definitions and Os/r/s codes are stated for the various
variables in the implicit tax models. Pre-tax return on equity (PTROE) is calculated
by dividing financial accounting income before taxes over the average of owner's
equity at the beginning and end of the year. The grossed-up pre-tax equivalent of
tax incentives on owner's equity (PTTIE) is calculated by first expressing the pre-
tax equivalent of tax incentives, which is defined as the difference between the
expected corporate income taxes to be paid (financial accounting income multiplied
by STR) and the tax expense. This pre-tax equivalent of tax incentives (PTTI) is
then divided by grossed-up owner's equity to derive at the grossed-up pre-tax
equivalent of tax incentives on owner's equity (PTTIE). The proxies for the product
(R&D expenses), and factor market (material costs and payroll costs) are scaled by
average total assets"' to enhance comparability across companies. Note, that in
model (4) the variables R&D, PC, ME, and STR are used as control variables (with
STR being a dummy variable capturing country differences), with the interaction
variables being the variables of interest.
"" As each country has one STR, this measure effectively acts as a dummy variable capturing
country differences in the PTROE-PTTIE relationship.













Definitions and O.v/m codes/mnemonics
Definition
Average of owners' equity at the
beginning and end of the year
Financial accounting income
before taxes
Pre-tax return on owners' equity
Statutory tax rate (STR)
Tax expense
Pre-tax equivalent of tax
incentives
Grossed-up pre-tax equivalent of













Retrieved from Buijink, Janssen, and Schols




(PTI* STR) - TE
(30260*STR) - 30265
f PTT11 r P777 ^
I OE J 130090J
(1-STR) (I-577?)
"R&D expense'V'average total assets"
22020/(average (30050, + 30050,.,))
"material expense'V'average total assets"
22155/(average (30050, + 30050,.,))
"salaries and benefits expenses'V'average
total assets"
22165/(average (30050, + 30050,.i))
" This variable shows a relatively large number of cases with missing data. Based on e.g.,
Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2002) such missing data are recoded "0". All subsequent analyses
are based on this recoded variable. Appendix 1 provides sensitivity analyses supporting this
recoding.
704.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive and univariate results
Below information is provided on the descriptive and univariate results. Table 3
displays the relative number of firm-years in 1 digit SIC industry categories"' as
well as the total number of firm-years for each EU member state.
Table 3 shows a number of countries with few firm-years in the sample.
Notably, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden"'' have each less than 300 firm-years in the sample and are therefore
excluded from subsequent country-analysis"'. Predominant among the companies
are SIC classifications 2 and 3 (both manufacturing), which account for 56.4% of
all companies in the sample. This indicates that the current sample is quite evenly
spread across one-digit SIC codes, as both Wilkie (1992) and Callihan and White
(1999) derived approximately 75% of their samples from companies in SIC
classification 2 and 3.
To restrict the influence of extreme observations on the subsequent
(multivariate) analysis, the PTROE and PTTIE variables were filtered. All
observations removed more than two standard deviations from the mean of
respectively PTROE and PTTIE were deleted from the file (Buijink, Janssen, and
Schols 2002). This filter reduced the dataset by a total of 204 firm-year
observations to 8,382 firm-years. All subsequent analyses use this filtered dataset.
Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics for the filtered and unfiltered pooled
sample.
"•* SIC 0 is agriculture, forestry and fishing, SIC I is mining and construction, SIC 2 and 3 are
manufacturing, SIC 4 is transportation and public utilities, SIC 5 is wholesale trade and retail
trade, SIC 6 is finance, insurance and real estate, SIC 7 and 8 are services, and SIC 9 is public
administration and non-classifiable establishments.
"•* These countries have the smallest stock exchanges in the European Union. Their lack of public
companies has also been apparent in earlier research. See, for example, Buijink, Janssen and
Schols 2001.
"' To restrict the loss of company-observations, observations from these countries are included in


















































































































































































































0.70%Below, descriptive statistics on the model (4) variables for the (filtered)









Descriptive statistics of the averages












































+ Firm-years; * Standard deviation ; Interquartile range
The R&D variable shows a null value for the median. This is related to the
recoding of this variable (see section 4.3.2). Table 4 also shows that the PTROE
and PTTIE variables"'' are characterized by a relatively large standard deviation.
Closer examination of the data reveals a main cause of this finding: extreme
observations" . The skewness and kurtosis statistics also indicate that the variables
do not approximate the normal distribution. Below, the correlation between the
variables is first examined using the Pearson correlation coefficient, the results of




























* : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
The correlation coefficient for the PTROE-PTTIE relationship is high, with a
value of-0.923, compared to the expected (theoretical) value of-1. This result
provides support for a strong implicit taxes relationship among the companies in the
sample. The Pearson correlation coefficients also indicate that the PTTIE and PC
"*" To test for a bias in data availability, the main model (I) relationship was tested for those
companies reporting data only on model (1) variables and for those companies reporting data on
all model (4) variables. The results of this analysis (reported in appendix 4) show no indications
for such a bias.
"' These extreme observations are partially caused by the nature of some of the variables: ratios.
Ratios tend to produce extreme observations whenever the nominator or denominator approaches
zero.
73variables in model (4) are significantly related to PTROE. They however also show
that the independent variables are sometimes significantly but moderately
correlated among themselves. Therefore, multicollinearity will not pose a serious
problem here. Correlation analyses using the nonparametric Spearman rank-
correlation coefficient show mostly similar relationships between the variables,
although some non-monotonous relationships between the variables seem to exist
(especially with regard to the STR variable). These Spearman rank-correlation
coefficients are reported in appendix 5.
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis
The following general multivariate model, where the company subscript i and time
subscript t are omitted, is used.
PTROE,; = a + ßiPTTIE + ß,PTTIE*R&D+ ß,R&D + p4PTTIE*ME + ßsME
+ ßftPTTIE*PC + ßvPC + ßsPTTIE*STR + ß>,STR + e (5)
An OLS regression analysis is used to estimate the multivariate model.
Below, the results for the pooled firm-years sample model are reported"®.
























































* : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
"* Appendix 6 includes OLS regression model results for separate years.
"' The data show some first-order autocorrelation (not reported). In a similar setting, Fama and
French (2000) adjust their t-values from 2.0 to 2.8 to infer reliability. As the appendices report
annual results, such an adjustment is not made.
74The results indicate a very good overall fit of the model. The R-square of
96.6% compares favourably to those of Wilkie (1992; 48%) and of Callihan and
White (1999; 24%), especially when taking into account differences between EU
member states. The model itself is significant at the 1% level'".
Overall, these results indicate the following. First, tax incentives are
important in explaining pre-tax returns across the EU, i.e., they create implicit
taxes. Second, focusing on the interaction variables, differences in product and
factor market competition impact the implicit taxes relationship in a predictable
way. And third, higher STRs strengthen the implicit taxes relationship.
In general, these results indicate that implicit taxes do have an impact on pre-
tax returns with additional effects for the interaction variables involving R&D, ME,
PC, and STR. These and previous findings in this chapter might however be
affected by theoretical and methodological issues. Therefore, the next paragraph
provides sensitivity analyses addressing some of these issues.
4.4.3 Sensitivity analyses
Although the findings from the OLS regression model indicate a substantial implicit
tax relationship across the EU countries, this finding might not hold for separate EU
countries. To investigate the country level implicit tax relationships OLS regression
models for EU countries with more than 300 firm-year observations are estimated.
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom provide sufficient data on all variables". The overall significance of the
models as well as the t-values and significance of the different variables is reported
in the Table below.
*° Following Bowen et. al. (1995), a dummy variable indicating companies in the durable goods
industry (SIC codes 150-179,245,250-259,283,301,324-399) was also incorporated in the OLS
regression model as a proxy for market power, which was also significant, but did not increase the
explanatory power of the model. Results of this test are reported in appendix 7.



























































































































































• : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% levelAgain, the models are significant in all countries, with significance of the
PTTIE variable in all countries. The results for the interaction variables are more
mixed.
Analysis of the data sample distribution characteristics (for descriptive data,
see appendix 3) indicates that the data are non-normally distributed. Both kurtosis
and skewness are outside of a normal distribution type range. This can indicate that
an OLS regression model is less suited to test for multivariate relationships in this
setting. To take account of the particular distributional characteristics in this study,
a rank regression model (RR) is used (also see chapter 3) to investigate the implicit
tax relationship. The RR procedure assigns a proportion of the variance of the
dependent variable to each unique value of the independent variables. The variables
were divided in ten equal-sized groups to estimate the parameters. Due to the fact
that each variable has ten different coefficients, no coefficients are included in
Table 8 which reports the empirical results for the RR.















































*: significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
(-): indicates a negative relationship between this variable and ETR1/2 in the RR model.
Overall, the OLS regression results are comparable with the rank regression
model results regarding the explanatory power of the model. That is, the implicit
taxes relationship is again quite strong for the examined companies. For the
individual variables, the results are as follows: The PTTIE and the interaction
variable coefficients are in general significant with the predicted sign.
Erickson and Maydew (1998) indicate a possible effect of company size on
implicit taxes. To investigate this possible effect, model (5) was specified with
average total assets as an additional variable. Results for this analysis (see appendix
8) show that company size has no influence on the findings reported above.
Part of the results of the analyses could be driven by incidental observations.
77To take such incidental observations into account, a balanced panel is constructed
for the years 1995-2000^. The balanced panel consists of 3,852 firm-year
observations. Again, an OLS regression model was estimated for this balanced
panel, the results of which are reported in appendix 9. The results of the balanced
panel show weaker results for two of the interaction variables.
4.5 Conclusion
Countries and their tax authorities impose corporate income taxes on companies. To
guide the economic activities of these agents, governments provide certain tax
incentives. The level of tax incentives between countries and companies differs,
influencing the effective level of taxation. These differences in effective taxation
would lead to differences in after-tax returns if companies were not traded in
competitive markets. The existence of such markets should lead to equal risk-
adjusted after-tax returns. Differences in effective taxation must thus lead to
differences in pre-tax returns by means of arbitrage.
Prior research has confirmed the existence of the implicit tax relationship
between tax incentives and pre-tax returns. However, this research indicated that
controls for market imperfections are necessary to capture the full implicit tax
effect. This chapter provides a more comprehensive framework to capture such
imperfections in product and factor markets. Also, this chapter is the first to
investigate implicit taxes in the European context, assessing the implicit tax
relationship across all EU-countries.
Statistical results provide strong support for the existence of the implicit tax
relationships across the European Union member states. The statistical results also
provide support for the proxies designed to capture differences in product- and
factor market differences. These are also statistically significant in explaining pre-
tax income levels. Finally, the level of tax rates systematically affects results across
countries, indicating that higher levels of statutory tax rates strengthen the implicit
taxes relationship.
'" A balanced panel only includes companies reporting all data for all years, thus excluding
companies, which do not report data for all years.
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Descriptive statistics of the/7/tera/ pooled sample for 1995-2000 with only Firm-Years




































































































For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* Standard deviation ; * Interquartile range
803 Descriptive statistics


































































































































































































































































For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* Standard deviation ; Interquartile range
824 Model (1) OLS regression for companies reporting data on model (1)
variables and companies reporting data on all model (4) variables
Model (1) OLS regression results for companies reporting data on model (1) variables
Variable FY Coefficient (-value Significance
Intercept 22,895 0.160 14.53 0.000**
PTTIE 22,895 -1.497 -294.3 0.000**
/{-.square fa#. Ä-s$«ar<?J 0.79/ fO.79;,)


















For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
835 Spearman correlation



























For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
*: significant at 5 percent level
**: significant at 1 percent level
84Separate year OLS regression results



























































































































































































































































































































For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
87OLS regression with durable goods dummy























































For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* : significant at the 10% level
**: significant at the 1% level




























































For variable definitions see section 4.3.2.
* : significant at the 5% level
**: significant at the 1% level
89OLS regression results for balanced panel
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This dissertation has examined (determinants of) explicit and implicit corporate
tax burdens in the Netherlands and the European Union. Three empirical studies
have been carried out to examine the three research questions. Finally, this
chapter will (i) provide a summary of this dissertation, (ii) discuss the use of
financial statement data, (iii) list the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical
studies, (iv) provide a conclusion and implications, and (v) indicate directions
for future research.
5.2 Summary
Chapter 1, the introduction, characterizes research on corporate income taxes.
This overview shows that the empirical research in the three subsequent chapters
can be characterized as corporate tax burden research in the tax planning domain
of the business subfield of corporate income tax research. The measurement of
the corporate tax burden can best be described as empirical micro backward
looking using average tax rates.
Included in this dissertation are three empirical studies. The first empirical
study, in chapter 2, assessed between-country differences in corporate tax
burdens within the European Union. To assess these corporate tax burdens, the
average effective tax rate (ETR) measure, based on financial statement data, was
used. Both the absolute level of ETRs as well as the difference between ETR
and statutory tax rates (STR) were examined, to be able to measure the level of
tax incentives provided to companies. Using the ffor/dsco/je CD-ROM database
to collect the sample, the reported ETRs showed considerable variations
91between and within countries. As European Union member states use different
financial accounting conventions, three different ETRs were specified. To take
the considerable variations in reported ETRs into account, the sample was
filtered by removing all observations being more than two standard deviations
from the mean of ETR1. In Table 1, STRs and median ETRs for the European





















































































For variable definitions, see chapter 2.
While some countries report only a small STR/ETR difference, other
countries have a large difference of up to about 20 percentage points. These
results might (partially) be driven by differences in financial accounting
conventions, so two alternative ETR definitions were also specified. In general,
these alternative ETR definitions produced comparable rankings. Such results
support the conclusion that the provision of tax incentives differs substantially
between countries and that these tax incentives do not lead to an equalization of
ETRs across countries in the European Union.
Earlier research (for an overview, see Callihan 1994 and Shackelford and
Shevlin 2001) has shown that ETRs differ within countries. This can be an
indication that similar firms do not pay similar taxes. Thus, chapter 3
investigates factors affecting corporate tax burdens in the Netherlands, to
determine whether the ETR distributions can be characterized by particular
sample attributes. To investigate the research question, a sample from the
Ä£/1CY/ CD-ROM database was retrieved containing 1,592 companies. Two
ETR measures were estimated, ETR1 based on earnings, and ETR2 based on
cash tlows. To control for extreme observations, all ETR observations being
more than two standard deviations from the mean were deleted. Based on
92previous empirical studies and the specific attributes of the Dutch corporate
income tax system, six variables were specified (excluding control and
interaction variables). OLS regression and rank regression (RR) model
specifications were used to test the influence of these variables on reported
ETRs. Table 2 provides statistical results for both model specifications.















































































































For variable definitions, see chapter 3.
*: Significant at the 5%-level
**: Significant at the 1%-level
The OLS regression and RR results indicate that the capital intensity
(CAPINT) and leverage (LEV) variables are significant in both the ETRl and
ETR2 models. However, the explanatory power of these variables and the model
in general tends to be very low. These results, combined with the finding of a
relatively small difference between STR and ETR, indicate that, for the
examined variables, the levying of corporate income taxes in the Netherlands is
fairly neutral. However, as far as these results (and the OLS regression results)
might be driven by methodological issues, sensitivity analyses were performed
for the following factors:
93• Control variables;
• Balanced panel data;
• Deferred taxes;
• Industry effects.
The results of the sensitivity analyses do not contradict the findings of the
OLS regression and RR models. That is, for the examined company attributes,
Dutch corporate income taxation is fairly neutral with the noted exception of
capital intensity and leverage being negatively associated with ETRs.
In the last empirical chapter, chapter 4, the implicit taxes framework, developed
by Scholes and Wolfson (1992), is tested in the European Union corporate
setting. The rationale behind the implicit taxes framework is that tax incentives
lower taxes payable, thereby increasing after-tax returns. This will enable tax
arbitrage which, in its turn, will drive up the demand for such investments,
thereby lowering the pre-tax returns. The differences in pre-tax returns of
normally taxed investments and lower taxed investments are called implicit
taxes. Scholes & Wolfson (1992), however, also indicate that this implicit taxes
relationship can only fully work in a setting without risk differences and tax
arbitrage inhibiting factors. The study in chapter 4 controls both for risk
differences (by the design of the empirical model) and tax arbitrage inhibiting
factors (by including three additional variables) in the model. Based on an Os/ra




















































































For variable definitions, see chapter 4.
•: Significant at the 5%-level
**: Significant at the 1%-level
94Table 3 shows some interesting results. First, the implicit tax relationship
in itself is very strong (indicated by the high R-square of the model and highly
significant t-/F-values of the PTTIE variable compared to earlier (US) research).
Second, the additional variables included to capture tax arbitrage inhibiting
factors are in most cases also significant. This indicates that, in general,
differences in product and factor market competition do affect the implicit taxes
relationship. The results for the STR variable indicate that differences in
statutory tax rates also have an impact on the implicit taxes relationship.
Furthermore, additional sensitivity analyses in chapter 4, indicates a significant
implicit taxes relationship in each of the 15 European Union member states,
with support for the significance of product and factor market proxies in most
countries.
5.3 The use of financial statement data
Corporate tax researchers can use a plethora of data including, but not limited to:
• Macro-economic data (e.g., OECD's national accounts);
• Micro-economic data (e.g., tax return data);
• Accounting data (e.g., financial statements);
• Simulation type data (e.g., King-Fullerton model).
This dissertation only uses accounting data from financial statements.
Financial statement data have particular attributes that provide advantages and
disadvantages to investigate the research questions set out in chapter 1 of this
dissertation. With regard to the specific research questions in this dissertation,
financial statement data have the following advantages:
• Data are publicly available, also on CD-ROM databases;
• Data on both listed and non-listed companies are available;
• Data are structured according to the national Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), reducing differences in reporting format;
• Data provide company-specific information;
• Both tax and non-tax information is available.
On the other hand, financial statement data also have some specific
disadvantages, including:
• National GAAPs still leave leeway in reporting of data, reducing the
comparability of data;
• Not all relevant information is always available, thereby limiting the use
of financial statement data.
95Overall though, the use of financial statement data provides unique
opportunities to measure (explicit and implicit) tax burdens at the company
level. At the same time though, the disadvantages of financial statement data
should be kept in mind, especially when interpreting the initial results of
statistical analyses. For this reason, this dissertation uses different statistical
techniques to test the hypotheses and filters the data to remove extreme
observations.
5.4 Strengths and weaknesses
Apart from the specific attributes of financial statement data, noted in the
preceding paragraph, the empirical chapters in this dissertation have a number of
strengths and weaknesses that should be noted here. Strengths include:
• The use of data for the European Union and the Netherlands, where most
previous research has used US data;
• Representation of actual (explicit and implicit) tax burdens by using
financial statement data, in contrast to, for instance, simulation based
data;
• Expansion of the scope of earlier empirical work on, for instance,
determinants of ETRs and implicit tax causing variables;
• By means of the statistical designs used, information is provided on the
country-specific attributes of fiscal policy.
Some of the weaknesses of the empirical chapters include:
• The used ETRs are not the actual taxes paid, but are reported tax expenses
(see also the preceding paragraph);
• Due to data limitations, not all variables could be tested in all settings;
• Due to the European Union setting of two studies, not all specific fiscal
country attributes could be incorporated in the research designs.
Despite these weaknesses, the empirical studies still provide a unique
insight in the levels of explicit and implicit tax burdens in the Netherlands and
the European Union, a geographical area that has not extensively been
investigated in previous empirical research with a focus on corporate income
taxes.
965.5 Conclusion and implications
At the end of this dissertation some conclusions and implications can be made.
First, all research methodologies in the three empirical chapters were based on
financial statement data. The use of this particular kind of data has specific
advantages and disadvantages as mentioned in paragraph 5.3. One particular
advantage is the additional insight offered compared to other data sources by
using company-level data. Policy setters often use simulation based data to make
tax policy changes (e.g., European Commission 2001). Such data may however
provide an incomplete representation of tax burdens as specific company
environment attributes cannot be taken into account. Financial statement
information, however, does include such information. This implies that, to
provide a comprehensive representation, policy setters should also use financial
statement information.
Second, the statistical results in chapter 2 showed large variations in STRs
and ETRs, as well as in STR/ETR differences. A closer examination of STR and
ETR levels showed that the spread of ETRs was not smaller than the spread of
STRs, thus providing no evidence for a "tax race to the bottom". Much of the
evidence of for this "tax race to the bottom" has been based on declining STRs
in the European Union. However, at the same time, taxable incomes have been
broadened, keeping effective levels of taxation at about the same levels. Such
trends cannot be discerned by solely examining STRs. ETRs have to be used for
this. The implication for policy setters and other parties interested in examining
tax burdens, is that they should investigate effective levels of tax burdens and
not just STRs.
Third, the examination of (possible) determinants of ETRs in the
Netherlands showed that there is a relatively small difference between STR and
ETR. The associations between company characteristics and ETRs, although
present in some cases, explain only a small portion of the STR-ETR difference.
In general these results indicate that the levying of corporate income taxes is
fairly neutral in the Netherlands, with only a small association between capital
intensity/leverage and ETRs.
Fourth, in chapter 4, the implicit taxes framework was tested in the
European Union setting. The statistical results indicate a strong implicit taxes
relationship across the European Union, but also for the individual EU member
states. The results, in general, also provide significant support for the effects of
tax arbitrage inhibiting factors, especially product and factor market competition
proxies. Furthermore, differences in STRs affect the implicit taxes relationship.
975.6 Directions for future research
Although this dissertation has tried to examine (determinants of) explicit and
implicit corporate tax burden in the Netherlands and the European Union, it
certainly has not answered all research questions that might be addressed.
Below, for the general research methodology and the three different research
questions, some suggestions for future research are made.
The research methodology in this dissertation has used financial statement
data. To (i) enhance the scope of these data, and (ii) test their reliability, these
data should be compared with (confidential) tax return data. So far, only one
(Dutch) study (Belastingdienst 1997) has examined actual corporate income tax
return data. This study did, however, not directly relate consolidated financial
statement data to tax return data.
Both from a management accounting perspective as well as from a
financial accounting perspective, different research questions could be
investigated. From a management accounting perspective, it would be very
interesting to assess the influence of STRs and ETRs on location decisions of
companies within the European Union. To a limited degree, this research
question has been investigated by using a questionnaire design. However, the
interaction itself between STRs/ETRs, management and location choice has not
comprehensively been investigated in the European Union. From a financial
accounting perspective, it would be very interesting to develop a measure of the
attributes of national tax systems in the European Union that indicate to what
extent governments provide tax incentives. In other words, a measure to
summarize the relative "fairness" of the corporate income tax.
£77?.S
Although previous empirical research relating company characteristics to
ETRs has found mixed results, this might partially be caused by the ability of
companies to "manage" their accounting numbers. This is partially taken into
account in the empirical setting, by using alternative ETR measures. However, it
might be useful to relate the relevant accounting data to the matching cash flow
data, providing additional proof on the comparability of accounting data.
98The amount of empirical research on implicit taxes in the corporate sector
has, so far, been limited. One of the main reasons for this (Callihan and White
1999) is the question as to how implicit taxes should be measured. A limited
amount of definitions have so far been used, but there is no agreement yet on the
best measure. It would therefore be very useful to examine and test the different
implicit taxes measures as to what a good implicit taxes measure is.
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(Nederlandstalige samenvatting)
Empirical Evidence on Explicit and Implicit Corporate Tax Burdens:
Three Studies
(Empirische Resultaten van Onderzoek naar Expliciete en Impliciete
Vennootschapsbelastingdruk: Drie Studies)
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om (determinanten van) de expliciete en
impliciete vennootschapsbelastingdruk op ondernemingen in Nederland en de
Europese Unie te onderzoeken. Hiertoe zijn in dit proefschrift drie studies
opgenomen:
Een empirisch onderzoek naar de exp//c/ete vennootschapsbelastingdruk
op ondernemingen met hun domicilie in de Europese Unie. Het doel van deze
eerste empirische Studie is om na te gaan wat de verschillen zijn tussen de
vennootschapsbelastingdruk op ondernemingen in de lidstaten van de Europese
Unie. Voor de berekening van de vennootschapsbelastingdruk wordt hierbij
gebruik gemaakt van gegevens uit jaarrekeningen.
Een empirisch onderzoek naar de deterw/nartteH van
vennootschapsbelastingdruk op ondernemingen met hun domicilie in Nederland.
In deze Studie wordt gekeken naar die karakteristieken van Nederlandse
ondernemingen die hun vennootschapsbelastingdruk kunnen beinvloeden. Voor
de berekening van de ondernemingskarakteristieken wordt gebruik gemaakt van
gegevens uit jaarrekeningen.
Een empirisch onderzoek naar de /mp/Zc/ete vennootschapsbelastingdruk
op ondernemingen met hun domicilie in de Europese Unie. Bij deze laatste
Studie wordt het impliciete belastingen model, zoals ontwikkeld door Scholes en
Wolfson (1992), getest op ondernemingen in de Europese Unie. Ook bij deze
Studie wordt gebruik gemaakt van gegevens uit jaarrekeningen.
Hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift geeft aan hoe de drie onderzoeken in dit
proefschrift geplaatst kunnen worden binnen de onderzoeksliteratuur. Hiertoe
111wordt er in dit eerste hoofdstuk onderscheid gemaakt tussen verschillende
soorten onderzoek op een aantal dimensies, namelijk:
• Belastingen: Welke belastingen zijn er binnen de classificaties directe en
indirecte belastingen? In dit proefschrift wordt enkel ingegaan op de
vennootschapsbelasting, een vorm van directe belastingen.
• Onderzoeksgebieden: Hier wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de
gebieden algemene economic bedrijfseconomie en rechten. Het
onderzoek in dit proefschrift vindt met name plaats op het gebied van de
bedrijfseconomie, hoewel er ook duidelijke relaties zijn met algemene
economie en rechten.
• Onderzoeksdomeinen: Het onderzoeksdomein vennootschapsbelasting
binnen de bedrijfseconomie kan onderverdeeld worden in drie domeinen:
naleving, planning en beleid, waarbij belastingplanning het belangrijkste
domein van dit proefschrift vormt. In het bijzonder wordt er binnen de
belastingplanning ingegaan op de vennootschapsbelastingdruk.
• Vennootschapsbelastingdruk: Deze kan op twee algemene manieren
worden gemeten: door middel van een gemiddelde of marginale
belastingdruk. De gemiddelde belastingdruk geeft hierbij met name een
indicatie van de rechtvaardigheid ("equity") van belastingheffing, terwijl
de marginale belastingdruk meer een indicatie geeft van de doelmatigheid
("efficiency") van belastingheffing.
• Methodologie: In de bestaande empirische literatuur wordt een drietal
methodologieen gebruikt: macro retrospectief, micro retrospectief en
micro prospectief. Bij de macro retrospectieve methodologie wordt
gebruik gemaakt van historische /wacro-ecortom/sc/je data. In
tegenstelling hiermee wordt bij de micro retrospectieve methode gebruik
gemaakt van historische m/cro-ecowom/sc/je data, terwijl bij de micro
prospectieve methodologie gebruik wordt gemaakt van
toekomstgeorienteerde micro-economische data. Bij de drie genoemde
methodologieen kan in een aantal gevallen onderscheid worden gemaakt
tussen een empirische en een theoretische meting. Bij een empirische
meting wordt gebruik gemaakt van empirische data, terwijl bij een
theoretische meting vaak gebruik wordt gemaakt van een simulatie
gebaseerd op verschillende scenario's. Binnen dit proefschrift wordt er
gebruik gemaakt van de micro retrospectieve methodologie met een
empirische meting.
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift bevat een empirische Studie naar de expliciete
vennootschapsbelastingdruk op ondernemingen met hun domicilie in de
Europese Unie. Het doel van deze Studie is om inzicht te geven in de relatieve
"concurrentie" positie van een land met betrekking tot de
vennootschapsbelasting. Landen hebben immers tal van mogelijkheden om hun
112vennootschapsbelastingsysteem attractiever te maken voor bedrijven en maken
daar in de praktijk ook frequent gebruik van, zoals ondermeer blijkt uit de
discussies binnen Europese Unie (EU) en Organisatie voor Economische
Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO) verband over schadelijke
belastingconcurrentie. Om de relatieve vennootschapsbelastingdruk te meten,
kunnen verschillende maatstaven worden gebruikt. Vaak wordt gebruikt
gemaakt van het wettelijke vennootschapsbelastingtarief. Dit tarief houdt echter
geen rekening met belastingprikkels die landen aan bedrijven kunnen
verschaffen. Een maatstaf die hier wel rekening mee houdt is de effectieve
belastingdruk (EBD), gedefinieerd als gerapporteerde belastingkosten gedeeld
door winst voor belasting (Callihan 1994). Een vergelijking van de EBD met het
wettelijke belastingtarief geeft informatie over de relatieve omvang van
belastingprikkels die verschaft worden door (nationale) overheden.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de wettelijke en effectieve belastingdruk onderzocht
voor de 15 Europese Unie lidstaten. Voor het verkrijgen van de data wordt
gebruik gemaakt van informatie uit jaarrekeningen, zoals opgenomen op de CD-
ROM database Wo/7dsco/?e. Omdat er verschillende externe
verslaggevingsformaten in de Europese Unie lidstaten worden gebruikt, worden
drie verschillende EBD-definities gebruikt. De eerste EBD-definitie komt
overeen met de definitie zoals hierboven weergegeven, terwijl bij de tweede
EBD-definitie netto omzet in de noemer wordt gebruikt in plaats van winst voor
belasting. De laatste, derde, EBD-definitie gebruikt enkel de huidige
belastingkosten (belastingkosten - dotatie voorziening latente belasting) in de
teller, gedeeld door winst voor belasting in de noemer. Om jaar tot jaar
verschillen tussen externe verslaggevingsdata en extreme data zoveel mogelijk
te vermijden, zijn er twee maatregelen genomen met betrekking tot de
steekproef:
• De steekproef is afkomstig uit meerdere jaren, hierbij is gebruik gemaakt
van de meest recente jaren die beschikbaar waren binnen de gebruikte
ffb/7dsco/?e database versie, dit waren de jaren 1990-1996;
• De steekproef is gefilterd; hierbij zijn alle EBD waarnemingen die meer
dan twee standaard afwijkingen van het gemiddelde afliggen verwijderd.
Deze maatregelen beperken weliswaar de omvang van de steekproef,
maar verhogen anderzijds de betrouwbaarheid van de uitkomsten van de
statistische analyses. De initiele steekproef bestaat uit 2.958 bedrijven met
20.706 bedrijfswaarnemingen en laat zien dat het aantal bedrijven sterk varieert
per land. Terwijl er voor Griekenland en Luxemburg slechts enkele
ondernemingen in de steekproef aanwezig zijn, telt het Verenigd Koninkrijk
ruim twee duizend ondernemingen. Uit de analyses van het wettelijke
belastingtarief en de verschillende EBD-tarieven blijken grote verschillen tussen
landen. Indien op basis van de eerste definitie van de EBD het verschil tussen
113net wettelijke en effectieve tarief wordt onderzocht, blijkt dat een aantal landen
(zoals Zweden, Frankrijk en Nederland) een klein verschil heeft, terwijl andere
landen (zoals Oostenrijk, Belgie en Portugal) een (veel) groter verschil hebben.
Dit verschil loopt op tot circa 20 procentpunten voor de laatst genoemde landen.
Hoewel de resultaten van de twee andere EBD-definities enigszins afwijken,
blijken ook uit deze definities grote verschillen tussen landen. Om na te gaan of
er in de EBD minder variatie is dan in het wettelijke tarief (conform de
gedachten van een "tax race to the bottom"), is gebruik gemaakt van de
"coefficient of variation". Op basis van analyses van deze "coefficient of
variation" kan niet worden gesteld dat de variatie in EBD kleiner is dan de
variatie in het wettelijke belastingtarief.
Uit de analyses in hoofdstuk 2 komen dus grote verschillen tussen landen
in EBD en wettelijk belastingtarief naar voren, maar geen directe bewijzen voor
een "tax race to the bottom", waarin de EBDen van de Europese Unie lidstaten
naar een lager niveau zouden moeten tenderen.
Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift is een onderzoek naar de determinanten van de
EBD in Nederland. Hierbij wordt in het bijzonder gekeken naar
ondememingsspecifieke factoren die van invloed kunnen zijn op de relatieve
hoogte van de EBD. Uit eerder Amerikaans onderzoek komt namelijk naar
voren dat verschallende ondernemingskenmerken (zoals ondernemingsgrootte en
kapitaalintensiteit) een invloed kunnen hebben op de EBD. Overheden
gebruiken immers vaak belastingprikkels om ondernemingen te sturen in hun
economische gedragingen.
De vraag in dit hoofdstuk is, in hoeverre dit ook in Nederland het geval is.
Op basis van het genoemde onderzoek en de specifieke attributen van de
Nederlandse vennootschapsbelasting zijn een zestal ondernemings-
karakteristieken opgenomen in het empirische model. Voor de steekproef is
gebruik gemaakt van de CD-ROM database /?£/JC// die de gegevens bevat van
Nederlandse jaarrekeningen. Op basis van een zestal selectiecriteria is er een
steekproef geselecteerd. Om rekening te houden met extreme waarnemingen en
jaar tot jaar verschillen in de externe verslaggevingsdata is er gebruik gemaakt
van een steekproef voor de jaren 1994-1999 en zijn de EBD data gefilterd op
twee standaard deviaties van het gemiddelde. Tevens zijn er twee EBD definities
gebruikt. Bij de eerste defmitie is EBD gedefinieerd als huidige belastingkosten
(totale belastingkosten - dotatie aan voorziening latente belastingen) gedeeld
door winst voor belasting, terwijl bij de tweede definitie, EBD is gedefinieerd
als huidige belastingkosten gedeeld door kasstroom. Zowel univariate als
multivariate analyses zijn gebruikt om de steekproef te onderzoeken. Uit deze
analyses komt naar voren dat er een relatief klein verschil is tussen EBD en het
nominale belastingtarief. Dit (kleine) verschil kan voor slechts een zeer klein
gedeelte worden toegerekend aan ondernemingskarakteristieken. Zowel
kapitaalintensiteit als de verhouding tussen vreemd en eigen vermögen zijn
114negatief geassocieerd met EBD. Zoals reeds eerder aangegeven, kan deze
associatie echter slechts een klein gedeelte van de verschillen in EBD verklaren.
Op basis van deze resultaten kan gesteld worden dat de heffing van de
vennootschapsbelasting op een relatief neutrale wijze plaatsvindt. Om na te gaan
of deze resultaten ook robuust zijn bij andere modelspecificaties, zijn
verschillende additionele analyses verricht. Deze analyses bevestigen de eerdere
bevindingen.
Hoofdstuk 4, het laatste empirische hoofdstuk, onderzoekt impliciete belastingen
in de Europese Unie. Overheden maken gebruik van belastingprikkels om het
gedrag van ondememingen te sturen. Deze belastingprikkels zullen de winst MO
6e/as//wg verhogen ten opzichte van investeringen waaraan geen (of minder)
belastingprikkels verschaft worden. Door middel van "arbitrage" zullen de
rendementen voor 6e/as//>;g van deze lager belaste investeringen omlaag moeten
gaan, zodat de rendementen «a fee/asftHgew van verschillende belaste
investeringen gelijk zullen zijn. De verschillen in rendementen voor 6e/ar.?/z>ig
van verschillend belaste investeringen worden impliciete belastingen genoemd.
Dit alles onder het voorbehoud van een gelijk risiconiveau en de afwezigheid
van fricties.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt expliciete aandacht geschonken aan de fricties die
de werking van "arbitrage" kunnen bemoeilijken. Hiertoe zijn een aantal proxies
voor product en factor markten opgenomen. Voor het meten van de impliciete
belastingen zelf is aangesloten bij eerder onderzoek. De steekproef is verzameld
uit de CD-ROM database Os/r/s die de jaarrekeningen van ondememingen uit
de Europese Unie bevat. Diverse univariate en multivariate modelspecificaties
zijn gebruikt om te onderzoeken in welke mate impliciete belastingen aanwezig
zijn in de Europese Unie. Indien er geen verstorende factoren zouden zijn, zou
de coefficient voor het verband tussen PTROE (proxy voor winst voor
belasting) en PTTIE (proxy voor impliciete belastingen) -1 moeten zijn (R" =
100%). Uit de resultaten komt een relatief sterk model naar voren dat circa 90%
van de variatie van PTROE verklaart, duidelijk meer dan in eerder onderzoek.
Uit de resultaten komt ook naar voren dat de proxies voor product- en
factormarkten een significante invloed hebben op de impliciete belasting relatie.
Voorts hebben verschillen in statutaire belastingtarieven ook een invloed op de
sterkte van de impliciete belasting relatie.
Hoofdstuk 5 rondt dit proefschrift af. In dit hoofdstuk wordt onder andere
aandacht besteedt aan:
• Het gebruik van externe verslaggevingsdata;
• De sterktes en zwaktes van de empirische studies;
• Implicates van de resultaten van de empirische studies.
115Alle drie de empirische studies in dit proefschrift maken gebruik van
externe verslaggevingsdata. Zulke data heeft specifieke voor- en nadelen
vergeleken met andere databronnen. Een van de belangrijkste voordelen is de
beschikbaarheid van data voor een groot aantal ondememingen. Een belangrijk
nadeel is dat door de verschillen in externe verslaggeving, de data niet volledig
met elkaar te vergelijken is. Dit is tevens een zwakte van de gekozen
onderzoeksopzet in dit proefschrift. Tot de sterktes van dit proefschrift behoren
het gebruik van data over Europese Unie landen en data die een representatie
geven van de werkelijke belastingdruk in tegenstelling tot bijvoorbeeld
simulatiedata.
Op basis van de resultaten van de empirische hoofdstukken kunnen een
viertal implicaties worden gemaakt. Ten eerste gebruiken beleidsmakers vaak
macro-economische data. Dit soort data mist het detail van micro-economische
data zoals deze in dit proefschrift wordt gebruikt. Beleidsmakers zouden er dan
ook goed aan doen om dit soort data ook te gebruiken om hun beslissingen op te
baseren. Op de tweede plaats dient bij onderzoek naar de belastingdruk niet
enkel gekeken te worden naar het wettelijke belastingtarief, maar ook naar de
EBD. De EBD is immers de resultante van wettelijk belastingtarief en verschafte
belastingprikkels. De derde implicatie is dat het algemene niveau van verschafte
belastingprikkels redelijk laag is, maar dat deze belastingprikkels wel
gerelateerd zijn aan winstgevendheid (positief) en kapitaalintensiviteit
(negatief)- Laatste en vierde implicatie is dat verschafte belastingprikkels het
niveau van winst voor belasting beinvloeden, maar dat daamaast ook product en
factor markt variabelen de impliciete belastingen relatie beinvloeden.
116curriculum vitae
Boudewijn Janssen was born on March 26, 1972 in Maastricht. From 1985 until
1991, he attended grammar school at Stella Maris College in Meerssen.
Subsequently, from 1991 to 1996, he studied Business Administration at
Universiteit Maastricht. Starting in 1996, he worked as a lecturer at the
Accounting department of Universiteit Maastricht. As of 1998, the position was
changed to assistant professor. From 1999 until 2002, he was also project
coordinator of a MARC research project. During 2000, he spent three months as
a visiting scholar at the accounting department of The University of Arizona.
Boudewijn Janssen is op 26 maart 1972 geboren in Maastricht. Gedurende de
jaren 1985-1991 ging hij naar middelbaar onderwijs op het Stelle Maris College
in Meerssen. Vervolgens studeerde hij van 1991 tot en met 1996 bedrijfs-
economie aan de Universiteit Maastricht. In 1996 begon hij als docent aan het
departement accounting van de Universiteit Maastricht. Met ingang van 1998
werd hij benoemd tot universitair docent. Van 1999 tot en met 2002 was hij
daarnaast ook project coordinator van een MARC onderzoeksproject.
Gedurende 2000 verbracht hij drie maanden aan het departement accounting van
The University of Arizona.
117